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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to those who
drafted it and those who worked for nearly a century to see it ratified, is
women’s equality. The ERA may be on the cusp of ratification depending
on congressional action and potential litigation. Its supporters continue
to believe the ERA would advance women’s equality. Their belief,
however, may be gravely mistaken. The ERA would likely endanger
women’s equality. The reason is that the ERA would likely prohibit
government from acting “on account of sex” and, therefore, from acting
on account of or in response to sex inequality. Put simply, government
would have to ignore sex, including sex inequality.
Consider race. The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause (EPC)
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to those who drafted and ratified it was racial equality. In the late
twentieth century, however, the Court began interpreting the EPC in a
way that prevents further progress toward racial equality. Through its
“strict scrutiny” test, the Court has essentially imposed on states and the
federal government a constitutional rule of “colorblindness,” a rule that
prohibits state-sponsored decisions that take account of race even when
aimed at reducing racial inequality and even when pursued through laws
that employ race-neutral means. As race-equality scholars know all too
well, colorblind constitutionalism tends to lock in racial inequality.
This article argues that the ERA likewise threatens to lock in
women’s inequality. Currently, the Court applies “intermediate scrutiny”
to sex-based classifications under the EPC, a scrutiny that prohibits
virtually all state-sponsored sex distinctions that harm women.
Intermediate scrutiny, however, allows sex distinctions that promote
women’s opportunities or otherwise advance women’s equality. Under
the ERA, the Court would likely apply “strict scrutiny,” which essentially
amounts to a constitutional rule of “sex-blindness,” prohibiting statesponsored decisions that take account of sex even when designed to
advance women’s equality and even when pursued through laws that
employ sex-neutral means. Furthermore, the ERA would endanger
single-sex settings, especially educational and extracurricular programs.
Moreover, the ERA would not prohibit any state-sponsored
discrimination against women that is not already unconstitutional under
the EPC. Nor does the ERA apply at all to the private sector in which
most of the concerns of ERA supporters occur, such as unequal pay,
sexual harassment, and violence against women. It is also doubtful that
the ERA would have any impact on reproductive rights. What is needed
is an alternative ERA that would explicitly authorize, or even require,
proactive efforts to advance women’s equality.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2020, Virginia became the thirty-eighth state to approve the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), reaching the minimum number of
states required to amend the United States Constitution.1 Though the
ERA’s legal validity remains an open question,2 it has achieved a
milestone for those who seek its enactment. ERA supporters believe
the amendment would advance and strengthen women’s equality.3
Support for the ERA is understandable given that women’s equality in
America remains grossly under-achieved4 and the Constitution does
not explicitly guarantee sex equality.
That support, however, may be gravely mistaken. The ERA is
unlikely to advance women’s equality and, indeed, would endanger that
1. Timothy Williams, Virginia Approves the E.R.A., Becoming the 38th State to Back It,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/us/era-virginia-vote.html.
2. Such difficulties include that the ERA was not ratified by the original 1979 deadline set
by two-thirds of Congress in legislation proposing the amendment to the states, or during
Congress’s purported extension by a simple majority to 1982, and because five states voted to
rescind their prior ratifications by 1982. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Of Synchronicity and
Supreme Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1220, 1295 (2019); DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND
AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1776-1995 at 408–09, 415 (naming the
rescinding states as Idaho, Kentucky, Nebraska, Tennessee, and South Dakota). These issues are
outside the scope of this article.
3. See discussion infra Section II.B.
4. See discussion infra Section I.B.
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goal. The ERA would likely prohibit our political institutions and
courts from advancing women’s equality.5 The best outcome for
women’s equality is for the ERA to expire. Moreover, not only is no
ERA better than the current ERA, even better for women’s equality
would be an alternative, more empowering sex-equality amendment.6
This article makes three claims. First, and most importantly, the
ERA would endanger equality for women7 because it would likely
prohibit government from addressing sources of women’s inequality
that government is authorized to address under current law.8 The
reason is that the ERA would likely require the government to be “sex
blind,” that is, ignore virtually all distinctions based on sex. Sexblindness would preserve the status quo of sex hierarchy by forbidding
efforts to remedy women’s inequality as such efforts necessarily require
taking account of, or “seeing,” sex. Race law provides an important and
troubling lesson. The Court’s colorblind constitutionalism, its
increasing trend to forbid government from taking account of race in
decision-making, has resulted in leaving significant racial inequalities
beyond the power of government to remedy.9
Second, to the extent the ERA’s dictates would promote women’s
equality, those dictates already exist under current equal protection
doctrine.10 Third, the ERA would have no effect on key goals of ERA
supporters, such as advancing equal pay and reducing sexual
harassment and violence against women.11 In short, the ERA is
unnecessary, inapplicable and, worst, dangerous to women’s equality.

5. See discussion infra Sections III.B.3 and III.C.2.
6. See infra Section IV for elements of an alternative amendment that would actually
promote women’s equality.
7. This article focuses on the potential effect of the ERA on the condition of women as
compared to men. It does not address the ERA’s effect on the condition of gay and lesbian
persons compared to heterosexual persons or on transgender or non-binary persons compared to
cisgender persons. The great degree of confusion over the ERA’s effect on women’s equality
justifies limiting the scope of this article to that subject. To the extent people of different sexual
orientations and gender identities include women, this article’s analysis includes them. The
ERA’s effects that may be distinctive to people of particular sexual orientations or gender
identities are critically important and merit their own, in-depth analysis in other scholarship.
8. See infra Sections III.B.3 and III.C.2.
9. See generally Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Canary Blind Constitution: Must Government
Ignore Racial Inequality?, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 56 (2016) (explaining the trend of
colorblind constitutionalism and its threat to addressing the sources of racial inequality); Kim
Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J.
2331, 2346 (2000) [hereinafter Race-Neutral Affirmative Action] (explaining why equal protection
doctrine logically prohibits race-neutral laws to promote racial equality).
10. See infra Section III.B.1.
11. See infra Sections III.B.3 and III.C.2.
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The article has four parts. Part I describes current laws that aim to
promote women’s equality and identifies significant inequalities that
nonetheless persist. Part II describes the ERA and how its supporters
believe it would aid in securing laws and policies to promote women’s
equality: namely, that the ERA would protect women against
discrimination and harassment in the workplace, promote equal pay,
support women’s reproductive rights and parental responsibilities, and
prohibit, or enable Congress to prohibit, violence against women.
Part III, the article’s main contribution, explains what the actual
effects of the ERA would likely be. Most importantly, the ERA would
likely prohibit government from adopting laws or policies intended to
advance women’s equality, including with respect to discrimination,
harassment, pay, parental responsibilities and violence. The ERA
would also likely jeopardize single-sex schools and other educational
programs. Part III also argues that the ERA is unnecessary to prohibit
state-sponsored intentional discrimination against women because
such discrimination is already presumptively unconstitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause. The ERA would also fail to challenge laws
that disparately impact women and would fail to apply at all to the
private sector in which the majority of pay discrimination, sexual
harassment and violence occurs. The ERA would thus not advance the
goals of its supporters but would instead block promising reforms that
could be pursued under current law. Part IV suggests the kinds of
provisions that an alternative, more promising ERA could include if
women’s equality is to be advanced by constitutional amendment. A
lesson of Part IV is that the ERA is not just worse than the status quo,
it is far worse than what could be achieved for women’s equality
through an alternative amendment.
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I. THE NEED FOR AN ERA
“I believe the rights of women and girls is the unfinished business
of the twenty-first century” – Hillary Clinton12
“We have come a long, long way, but we have a long, long way to go
before the problem is solved.” – Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.13

A. Current Laws Designed to Promote Women’s Equality
The Supreme Court did not interpret the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution to protect women until the early 1970s.14 Since then,
the Court has increasingly interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to
prohibit state-sponsored sex discrimination. For any such
discrimination to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the government
must demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive” justification.15 When
applying the test that has come to be called “intermediate scrutiny,” the
government must demonstrate that the discriminatory use of sex is
“substantially related” to an “important” governmental interest.16 This
test invalidates the great majority of state-sponsored sex
discriminations, especially those against women.
Several federal laws expressly aim to advance women’s equality.
One of the first was the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which prohibits men
and women from receiving different pay for doing substantially the
same work unless an employer can demonstrate that the difference in
pay is based on a factor “other than sex.”17 The Civil Rights Act of 1964
12. Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Keynote Address at Girls, Inc. Annual Luncheon
(Mar. 7, 2017).
13. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Convocation Speech at Illinois Wesleyan University
(February 10, 1966).
14. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (The first case to apply a more searching degree
of judicial scrutiny to sex-based classifications, holding that because “[§ 15-314] provides that
different treatment be accorded to the applicants on the basis of their sex; it thus establishes a
classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause”); see also Deborah L. Brake,
Sex As A Suspect Class: An Argument for Applying Strict Scrutiny to Gender Discrimination, 6
SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 953, 954 (1996) (explaining that in Reed, “the Supreme Court for the
first time applied a higher level of scrutiny to sex discrimination.”).
15. See Univ. of Miss. Sch. for Nursing v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (stating that “[t]he
party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry
the burden of showing an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the classification”); United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (explaining that a court confronted with a statesponsored sex classification must determine whether the state’s proffered justification is
“exceedingly persuasive” and, moreover, “[t]he burden of justification is demanding and it rests
entirely on the State”).
16. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional challenge . . .
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives.”).
17. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2018).
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prohibits intentional sex discrimination in virtually all aspects of
employment.18 It also prohibits most employment practices that have
an unintentional disparate impact on the basis of sex unless such
practices are shown to be “job-related . . . and consistent with business
necessity.”19 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) protects women
from discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth and related
medical conditions.”20 The PDA also requires accommodation of
pregnant employees if accommodations are made for other employees
similar in their ability or inability to work.21 The Family and Medical
Leave Act requires employers to provide unpaid leave to employees to
care for a child or other relative.22 The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
allows claims of sex (and other) discrimination in compensation to be
brought that previously would have been time barred by the statute of
limitations.23 Indeed, as Justice Alito documented in Bostock v. Clayton

18. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (prohibiting intentional sex
discrimination in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (allowing respondent to answer a disparate impact
claim by proving the challenged employment practice is necessary to the business).
20. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (West, Westlaw through P.L.
112-3 (excluding P.L. 111-296, 111-314, 1U-320, 111-350, 111-377, and 111-383)). The Act extends
protection from employment discrimination to “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions.” Id. (excluding P.L. 111-296, 111-314, 1U-320, 111-350, 111-377, and 111-383)). The
Act extends protection from employment discrimination to “pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions.” Id.
21. See id. (“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”). The Court
interpreted the same-treatment clause of the PDA in Young v. Utd. Parcel Svc., 135 S. Ct. 1338,
1348–55 (2015).
22. Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601–54, 2601(a)(5), 2601(b)(4) (West,
Westlaw through P. L. 113–63).
23. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2 (2009) (superseding the
Supreme Court’s holding in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007),
which had required that a charge of compensation discrimination be filed within 180 days (or 300
days in some jurisdictions) from the discriminatory, pay-setting decision. The Act relaxed this
strict application of the statute of limitations and instead decreed that a claim of discrimination
starts anew with each paycheck that delivers compensation affected by a discriminatory decision.
The Act also extended protection to pay discrimination based upon race, color, religion, national
origin, age or disability. A person subject to pay discrimination can now file a charge within 180
(or 300) days of any of the following: (1) An employer adopts a discriminatory pay decision or
other practice; (2) An individual becomes subject to a discriminatory pay decision or other
practice; or (3) An individual is affected by a discriminatory pay decision or other practice, which
includes each time an individual receives pay that is reduced because of a discriminatory pay
decision or other practice.).

FORDE-MAZRUI_03_17_21 (DO NOT DELETE)

8

3/17/2021 6:35 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 16

County, over one hundred federal laws and executive orders prohibit
sex discrimination in a broad range of contexts.24
B. Persistent Women’s Inequality and the Inadequacy of Current Law
Despite the foregoing laws against sex discrimination, ERA
proponents remain justifiably concerned about the persistence of
women’s inequality. Women are statistically worse off than men across
a wide range of economic and social measures. Women’s income,25
wealth,26 and professional attainment27 lag significantly behind that of
men. Women are underrepresented in a range of occupations, including
police, fire, construction, technology, company management, corporate
boards, and business ownership.28 In such occupations, moreover,
women earn less than men29 and are much more likely to be harassed
on the job.30 In education, girls and women face discrimination and
continue to be underrepresented in certain fields, such as STEM,
medicine, and business.31 Women remain significantly less likely to hold
positions of power, whether in the private sector or in government
institutions.32 And women’s health, particularly their reproductive
24. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1768–70 (2020), (Alito, J., dissenting)
(describing several such laws); id. at Appendix C (listing many more laws that prohibit sex
discrimination).
25. Jennifer Safstrom, Salary History and Pay Parity: Assessing Prior Salary History as a
“Factor Other than Sex” in Equal Pay Act Litigation, 31 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 135, 139 (2019).
26. Janice Traflet & Robert E. Wright, America Doesn’t Just Have a Gender Pay Gap, It has
POST
(Apr.
2,
2019),
a
Gender
Wealth
Gap,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/04/02/america-doesnt-just-have-gender-pay-gapit-has-gender-wealth-gap/.
27. See Safstrom, supra note 25, at 135, 154.
28. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK
46–64 tbl. 11 (2019); Matt Egan, Still Missing: Female Business Leaders, CNN MONEY (Mar. 24,
2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/03/24/investing/female-ceo-pipeline-leadership (stating that
women held 16.5% of the top four executive board positions and 14% of all executive board
positions in S&P 500 companies); AM. EXPRESS, THE 2017 STATE OF WOMEN-OWNED
BUSINESSES REPORT: SUMMARY OF KEY TRENDS 3 (2017) (stating that women-owned
businesses accounted for 39% of all U.S. firms).
29. The State of the Gender Pay Gap 2020, PAYSCALE (Jul. 31, 2020),
https://www.payscale.com/data/gender-pay-gap#section06.
30. See Women’s Initiative, Gender Matters: Women Disproportionately Report Sexual
Harassment in Male Dominated Industries, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2018/08/06/454376/gender-matters/.
31. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 28, at 46–64.
32. See id. at 2; see also Judith Warner, Nora Ellmann, & Diana Boesch, The Women’s
FOR
A M.
PROGRESS
(Nov.
20,
2018),
Leadership
Gap,
CTR.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2018/11/20/461273/womens-leadershipgap-2/ (American women lag substantially behind men in terms of their representation in
leadership positions.); Gary M. Kramer, Limited License to Fish Off the Company Pier: Toward
Express Employer Policies on Supervisor-Subordinate Fraternization, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
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needs, are inadequately served compared to men’s.33 Women are far
more likely than men to experience domestic battering, sexual assault,
and rape.34 Many of the foregoing disparities, moreover, tend to be
especially acute for poor women and women of color.35 As Professor
Brandy Faulkner observes, “We know that women still face sex and
gender discrimination, but we don’t all experience it in the same way.
Intersections of race and class position us differently in the powerbased hierarchy of sex and gender.”36
Women’s equality advocates have identified several gaps in current
law which they believe contribute to women’s inequality. One is that
the intermediate-scrutiny test is more permissive of sex discrimination
than is the stricter test which the Court applies to race discrimination.37
77, 81–84 (2000).
33. Keegan Warren-Clem, Unnecessary, Avoidable, Unfair, and Unjust: [En]Gendered
Access to Care in the PPACA Era and the Case for a New Public Policy, 13 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
119, 122–23, 158–59 (2016).
34. See Statistics, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://ncadv.org/statistics
(last visited March 1, 2021) (one in four women and one in nine men experience severe intimate
partner physical violence, intimate partner contact sexual violence, and/or intimate partner
stalking with impacts such as injury, fearfulness, post-traumatic stress disorder, use of victim
services, contraction of sexually transmitted diseases, etc.; one in five women and one in seventyone men in the United States has been raped in their lifetime).
35. See, e.g., Brandy S. Faulkner, Will the ERA Lift All Boats?, GENDER POL’Y REP. (July
14, 2020), https://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/will-the-era-lift-all-boats/ (observing that sexbased disparities affect poor women and women of color more significantly, especially with
respect to health and income); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 28, at 4
(explaining that “the ratio of the working poor to all individuals who were in the labor force for
at least 27 weeks was 5.3 percent for women and 3.8 percent for men. . . . The working-poor rates
for Black and Hispanic women were 10.0 percent and 9.1 percent, respectively, compared with
4.5 percent for White women and 2.5 percent for Asian women.”); Warren-Clem, supra note 33,
at 126–27 (discussing how limited financial resources inhibits one’s “ability to acquire [health]
care” and explaining that the pay gap between men and women exacerbates women’s ability in
particular to access health services).
36. Faulkner, supra note 35.
37. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Lisa Baldez, & Tasina Nitzschke Nihiser,
Constitutional Sex Discrimination, 1 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 11, 49 (2004) (finding that in state court
decisions where intermediate scrutiny was applied, the litigant alleging sex discrimination
prevailed 47 percent of the time, suggesting that a litigant is “nearly as likely to win as they are to
lose” under intermediate scrutiny. In contrast, the success rate of litigants in state courts applying
strict scrutiny (the same test used for race-based discrimination), is 73 percent); Sarah M.
Stephens, At the End of Our Article III Rope Why We Still Need the Equal Rights Amendment, 80
BROOK. L. REV. 397, 408, 412 (2015) (arguing “[t]he ability of the Equal Protection Clause to
eliminate sex discrimination is limited by the Court’s inconsistent application of the intermediate
scrutiny standard and its refusal to subject claims of sex discrimination to the strict scrutiny
standard . . . . [I]ntermediate scrutiny is not functional because it does not provide a clear and
consistent rule”); See “A New Era for the Equal Rights Amendment,” Equal Rights Amendment
Conference Transcription, 23 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 145, 159 (2020) (panel presentation of Kate
Kelly) (describing how, under intermediate scrutiny, it is “easier to pass and keep sexist laws on
the books” and that the ERA would change this by applying strict scrutiny instead to such laws).
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For state-sponsored race discrimination, the Court applies “strict
scrutiny,” which requires the government to demonstrate that
discriminating by race is “necessary” or “narrowly tailored” to achieve
a “compelling interest.”38 Such a test invalidates virtually all racebased discriminations, including discriminations that would be upheld
if subject only to the intermediate scrutiny applied to sex-based
discriminations. Some ERA proponents thus regret that intermediate
scrutiny could uphold sex discrimination that would be prohibited if
courts applied strict scrutiny to sex discrimination.39
Another shortcoming of current constitutional law is that laws or
policies with an unintentional disparate impact on women are immune
from challenge unless they are proved to be intentionally designed to
discriminate against women. The Court made this clear in Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, in which the Court upheld a
state hiring and promotion preference for veterans, despite its having
an overwhelmingly disparate impact against women.40 At the time, the
military excluded women from most military positions, so very few
women would qualify for such preference.41 The Court had already
held in Washington v. Davis that the Equal Protection Clause only
prohibits race discrimination that is purposeful.42 In Feeney, the Court
applied the same rule to sex discrimination and explained that
purposeful discrimination requires that the state adopted the law
“because of” and not merely “in spite of” the law’s effect on the

38. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that “racial
classifications . . . must be analyzed . . . under strict scrutiny . . . . [S]uch classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests”).
39. See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 37, at 411 (pointing to Justice O’Connor’s dissent in
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), as a recent example of where the application of the
intermediate scrutiny standard operated to uphold a law that reflected the sexist assumption that
a child born out of wedlock was the sole responsibility of the mother, which is exactly the type of
sex-based stereotype intermediate scrutiny is supposed to strike down); id. at 426–27 (“Women
continue to be treated unequally under the law . . . because the intermediate scrutiny standard
permits gender discrimination . . . .”); Robin Bleiweis, The Equal Rights Amendment: What You
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(Jan.
29,
2020),
Need
To
Know,
CTR.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2020/01/29/479917/equal-rightsamendment-need-know/ (stating that the ERA would “bolster[] the argument that judicial review
of cases alleging sex discrimination should utilize the highest level of legal scrutiny, requiring a
compelling state interest to deem a particular sex-based action or practice constitutional.
Heightened scrutiny would make it harder to dismiss or reject sex discrimination claims and
protections outright.”).
40. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979).
41. Id.
42. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976).
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protected group.43 Thus, notwithstanding that Helen Feeney was more
qualified than the veterans hired over her, her repeated rejections for
promotion were upheld because disparate impact alone does not
implicate the Equal Protection Clause.44
Two additional gaps in legislative protections of women have raised
concerns. First, the disparate-impact provision of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment policies with
unintentional but unjustified disparate impacts based on “race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin,” appears not to apply to sex differences
in pay.45 Second, Congress cannot prohibit private violence against
members of vulnerable social groups, including women. The reason is
because the Supreme Court struck down the provision of the Violence
Against Women Act that proscribed gender-motivated violence,
holding that Congress did not have power under the Commerce Clause
or Equal Protection Clause to prohibit violence between private
individuals.46
Beyond these particular gaps in the law, women’s equality
advocates point to systemic disadvantages that women face in
employment, corporate leadership, and access to political power, which
current laws have failed to correct. For example, the work-schedule
expectations of the American workplace continue to disadvantage
female employees, including highly educated professionals, who
disproportionately need to divide their time between work and family

43. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 258.
44. Id. at 273 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results.”);
see also Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating Their
Effectiveness, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201, 1223–27 (2005) (critiquing the Court’s refusal to recognize
disparate impact against women as constitutionally problematic).
45. See Cnty. of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168 (1981) (permitting Title VII
action for intentional sex-pay discrimination under reasoning that would deny disparate-impact
claims for sex-pay discrimination); see also Joseph E. Broadus, No Disparate Impact: Gunther’s
Significant but Ignored Limitations on Sex-Based Pay Disparity Claims under Title VII, 12 NAT’L
BLACK L.J. 10, 10 (1990) (observing that there is no disparate-impact liability for sex differences
in pay because of Gunther). The failure of Title VII to prohibit employment practices with a
disparate impact on women with respect to pay is why proposed legislation would recognize such
a claim. See The Paycheck Fairness Act, S.270, 116th Congress (2019–2020).
46. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that the Commerce Clause
did not authorize the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)); Id. at 621 (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause did not authorize the VAWA because equal protection only applies to state
action).
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responsibilities.47 Equality advocates also criticize inadequate access to
and protection for family planning and reproductive rights.48
Thus, despite a range of constitutional and legislative protections
against sex discrimination, sex inequality remains significant. The
interest of equality advocates in the ERA is accordingly
understandable.
II. THE ERA AND ITS SUPPORTERS’ ASPIRATIONS
A. The ERA’s Text and Brief History
The ERA’s text reads:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date
of ratification.49

Drafted by Alice Paul and Crystal Eastman,50 the ERA was first
proposed in 192351 following the adoption of the 19th Amendment in
1920.52 After decades of congressional inaction, Congress approved the
ERA in 1972 with the requisite two-thirds’ consent of each chamber.53
47. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Synergistic Solutions: An Integrated Approach to Solving
the Caregiver Conundrum for “Real” Workers, 39 STETSON L. REV. 777, 777–78, 781–82 (2010)
(“Most employers build workplaces around norms and policies designed for employees who can
work full-time and overtime with no interruptions throughout their entire career. In other words,
most workplaces are designed around men.”).
48. See KHIARA BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY AS
A SITE OF RACIALIZATION 37–60 (2011).
49. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92nd Cong. (1971).
50. See JULIE SUK, WE THE WOMEN: THE UNSTOPPABLE MOTHERS OF THE EQUAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT 28 (2020).
51. Deborah Machalow, The Equal Rights Amendment in the Age of #metoo, 13 DEPAUL J.
FOR SOC. JUST. 1, 1 (2019); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Need for the Equal Rights Amendment, 59
A.B.A. J. 1013, 1013 (Sept. 1973).
ARCHIVES,
52. The
19th
Amendment,
Online
Exhibits,
NAT’L
https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured-documents/amendment-19 (last visited Jan. 12, 2021).
53. Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 1013; Joan A. Lukey & Jeffrey A. Smagula, Do We Still Need
A Federal Equal Rights Amendment?, 44 BOSTON B.J. 10, 28 (Jan./Feb. 2000) (“The ERA was
introduced in every session of Congress from 1923 to 1972, when it was passed by Congress and
sent to the states for ratification. The ratification process burst out of the starting gate, with the
ERA garnering 22 of the necessary 38 state ratifications in its first year, and eight more in 1973.
By 1976, however, only three additional states had ratified the proposed amendment. Congress
extended the initial seven-year time limit by three years, but by the June 30, 1982 deadline, the
ERA fell three states short of the 38 states required for ratification. The amendment has been
reintroduced in every Congressional session since that time.”).
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Although the amendment did not contain a time limit for ratification
(unlike some amendments),54 the legislation sending the amendment to
the states set a seven-year time limit, expiring in 1979.55 Thirty-five
states voted in favor of the ERA by 1979,56 three states shy of the
required thirty-eight. Congress passed legislation purporting to extend
the time limit to 1982, but no additional states ratified it and five states
purported to rescind their earlier ratification by 1982.57
After the ERA spent decades in dormancy, ERA advocates gained
inspiration to seek ratification when, in 1992, the congressional
Archivist accepted as validly ratified the 27th Amendment.58 Proposed
by James Madison, the amendment was sent to the states by Congress
for ratification in 1789 but the 38th state did not approve it until 1992,
over two hundred years after the ratification process began.59 The
acceptance of the “Madison Amendment” suggested that the ERA
might still be adopted despite the passage of time, at least if Congress
were to pass legislation extending or eliminating the deadline. By early
2020, three states, Nevada (2017), Illinois (2018) and Virginia (2020),
voted to ratify the ERA, making thirty-eight states to have voted for
the ERA.60 The federal House of Representatives then passed a
resolution in 2020 to remove the 1982 deadline, but the Senate has not
taken any action on it.61 Though the expiration of Congress’s deadline
and the purported rescission by some states raise questions about the

54. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 3 (stating that the proposed article “shall be
inoperative” unless ratified by the states “[a]s provided in the Constitution, within seven years
from the date of the submission . . . to the states by the Congress.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
XX, § 6 (stating that three-fourths of state legislatures must ratify the amendment within “seven
years from the date of its submission” or it would be inoperative); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
XXI, § 3 (setting a seven-year time limit for the states to ratify the amendment, otherwise it would
become inoperative); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 2 (explaining that the amendment
would be inoperative unless ratified by the states within seven years of its submission by
Congress).
55. See Lukey & Smagula, supra note 53, at 10.
56. Id.
57. H.R.J. Res. 638, 95th Cong., 92 Stat. 3799 (1978) (extending the ERA ratification
deadline to June 30, 1982); DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995, at 408–09, 415 (naming the rescinding states as Idaho, Kentucky,
Nebraska, Tennessee, and South Dakota).
58. 138 CONG. REC. 11,656 (1992).
59. Gerard N. Magliocca, Buried Alive: The Reboot of the Equal Rights Amendment, 71
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 633, 639 (2019).
60. Ryan W. Miller, 3 State Attorneys Sue to Recognize ERA as 28th Amendment, USA
TODAY (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/01/30/era-virginiaillinois-nevada-attorneys-general-announce-lawsuit/4618804002/.
61. Removing the Deadline for the Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, H.R.J.
Res. 79, 116th Cong. (as passed by H.R., February 13, 2020).
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ERA’s legal status, this article focuses on what the likely effect of the
ERA would be on women’s equality if it were incorporated into the
Constitution.
B. ERA Aspirations
ERA supporters, whose diverse views are grouped here for
simplicity, believe that the ERA would advance women’s equality in
three key ways. First, the ERA should directly change the selfexecuting operation of the Constitution in ways that promote women’s
equality.62 Second, the ERA should indirectly promote women’s
equality by authorizing Congress to enact equality-advancing laws that
Congress currently lacks constitutional authority to enact.63 And third,
the ERA should establish greater legal stability for and recognition of
the equal rights of women.64
One of the direct, self-executing effects anticipated by ERA
supporters is that the ERA would prohibit laws that have an
unintentional disparate impact against women unless the government
can demonstrate a strong justification for such laws..65 Thus, for
example, a state or federal employer’s practice of setting salary of new
employees based on prior salary or barring employees from sharing
salary information with coworkers would be legally vulnerable under
the ERA as both tend to have a disparate impact on women’s pay.66

62. See supra notes 40 to 46 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 73 to 90.
63. See Wharton, supra note 44, at 1209 (describing how United States v. Morrison
illustrates that “[t]he conservative majority of the Supreme Court has limited the power of
Congress to pass laws protecting sex equality and other individual rights even in instances where
an abysmal record of state failure in enforcing equality exists.”).
64. See Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 1014 (listing a number of state laws that would be
“destined for the scrap heap” should the ERA pass, including ones that expressly mandate that
only men can occupy certain government positions, like governor and secretary of state); see also
Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights
for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 884 (1971) (explaining how the adoption of a constitutional
amendment has a political and psychological impact that serves to strengthen efforts to abolish
existing “[d]iscriminatory laws, doctrines, attitudes and practices [that] are set deep in our legal
system”).
65. See Serena Mayeri, A New E.R.A. or A New Era? Amendment Advocacy and the
Reconstitution of Feminism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1223, 1226 (2009) (explaining that by the early
1980s, proponents of the ERA wanted “[a] constitutional response not only to intentional
discrimination . . . but also to the unintentional perpetuation of inequality through laws and
policies that appeared neutral on their face—a conception of equality that included . . . remedies
for disparate impact discrimination . . . .”); Stephens, supra note 37, at 416 (arguing that the ERA
would eliminate the need to provide evidence of purpose or intent to discriminate in order to
“[i]nvalidate governmental action that has a disparate impact on gender.”).
66. See generally Nancy Levit & Joan Mahoney, The Future of Comparable Worth Theory,
56 U. COLO. L. REV. 99 (1984) (explaining that these salary-setting practices based on prior wages
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In addition to its direct effect, some ERA supporters argue that the
ERA would empower Congress to enact laws that Congress currently
cannot. In United States v. Morrison,67 the Court invalidated the
provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) that created
civil liability for private individuals who perpetrate gender-motivated
violence.68 The Court held that Congress lacked authority under the
Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause to regulate private
violence that is not part of economic activity.69 Kate Kelly, a prominent
ERA supporter with Equality Now, contends that the ERA would
empower Congress to re-enact VAWA under Section 2 of the ERA.70
Kelly also predicts that the ERA could validate the congressional ban
on female genital mutilation,71 which a federal court recently
invalidated under Morrison, because such a practice by private actors
is not “economic activity” and thus not within Congress’s Commerce
Clause power to regulate.72
Finally, ERA supporters claim that the ERA would promote
stability and recognition of women’s equality.73 Stability would be
advanced by (1) expressly protecting sex equality in the Constitution,
thereby making it less susceptible to dilution through judicial

have a disparate impact on women due to historic discrimination and should be evaluated under
a disparate impact theory of liability, which would not require a showing of intentional
discrimination); Torie Abbott Watkins, The Ghost of Salary Past: Why Salary History Inquiries
Perpetuate The Gender Pay Gap And Should Be Ousted As A Factor Other Than Sex, 103 MINN.
L. REV. 1041 (2018) (identifying disparate impact against women of considering past salary);
Brian P. O’Neill, Pay Confidentiality: A Remaining Obstacle to Equal Pay after Ledbetter, 40
SETON HALL L. REV. 1217 (2010) (identifying pay confidentiality policies as source of unequal
pay).
67. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
68. Id. at 598–99 (holding that neither the Commerce Clause nor § 5 of the 14th Amendment
give Congress the authority to enact a civil federal remedy for the victims of gender-motivated
violence, as provided for in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)).
69. Id. at 613 (concluding that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense
of the phrase, economic activity”).
70. See “A New Era for the Equal Rights Amendment,” supra note 37.
71. Id.
72. See United States v. Jumana Nagarwala et al., No. l 7-cr-20274 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 20,
2018) (invalidating federal ban on genital mutilation because not within Congress’s Commerce
Power nor is it necessary and proper to enforce a treaty).
73. See Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 1014 (arguing that “major legislative revision” to existing
statutes that discriminate on the basis of sex will “probably” not occur “without the impetus of
the Equal Rights Amendment”); see also Brown et al., supra note 64, at 885 (“The demand for
equality of rights before the law is only a part of a broader claim by women for the elimination of
rigid sex role determinism. And this in turn is part of a more general movement for the recognition
of individual potential, the development of new sets of relationships between individuals and
groups, and the establishment of institutions which will promote the values and respect the
sensibilities of all persons.”).

FORDE-MAZRUI_03_17_21 (DO NOT DELETE)

16

3/17/2021 6:35 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 16

interpretation74 and (2) shielding sex equality from the risk that
Congress could weaken or repeal current statutory protections.75 For
similar reasons, some also believe that reproductive rights would be
more secure under the ERA than under current law, which relies on
judicial interpretations of the Due Process Clause.76
The ERA would also serve a symbolic or expressive purpose: It
would explicitly recognize that women are equal to men. Justice
Ginsburg, among others, has observed that including sex in the
Constitution would establish an explicit constitutional value that
women are equal to men.77 This principle is important in itself, but it
74. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, The Equal Rights Amendment: Then and Now, 17 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 419, 441–42 (2008) (arguing that ERA lawsuits would be subject to strict scrutiny,
which is less open to interpretation than the current intermediate scrutiny standard and would
lead to less judicial discretion in how the standard is applied); Wharton, supra note 44, at 1213
(“Lower courts, commentators, and even Supreme Court Justices, have criticized the
intermediate standard as vague, poorly defined and malleable, providing insufficient guidance in
individual cases and giving broad discretion to individual judges in deciding the importance of an
interest and whether the classification is substantially related.”).
75. Jessica Neuwirth, Time for the Equal Rights Amendment, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 155, 157 (2019) (“The legal framework for addressing sex inequality is a patchwork quilt
of legislation that is full of holes . . . . [L]egislation can be rolled back with any change in the
political winds of Congress.”); Lauren Walker, After Nearly a Century, 2020 May Usher in the
Equal Rights Amendment, TRUTHOUT (Dec. 20, 2019), https://truthout.org/articles/after-nearlya-century-2020-may-usher-in-the-equal-rights-amendment/.
76. See Stephens, supra note 37, at 414–16, 422 (citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), where the
Court refused “[t]o admit that discrimination based on reproductive capacity, choice, or
autonomy is sex discrimination and that laws which impact some, but not all, women on that basis
are discriminatory” and arguing that “if the ERA were enacted, it would force the Court to reevaluate its position on the treatment of pregnancy and the related issue of abortion funding”);
see also Eleanor Mueller & Alice Miranda Ollstein, How the Debate Over the ERA Became a
Fight Over Abortion, POLITICO (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/
11/abortion-equal-rights-amendment-113505 (“Advocates for the ERA acknowledge that
abortion needs to be part of the conversation. Any debate over women’s rights, they say, must
also address control over when and whether to have children.”).
77. Nikki Schwab, Ginsburg: Make ERA Part of the Constitution, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washington-whispers/2014/04/18/
justice-ginsburg-make-equal-rights-amendment-part-of-the-constitution
[https://perma.cc/BD9V-FXCB] (speaking to an audience at the National Press Club, Justice
Ginsburg said “I would like my granddaughters, when they pick up the Constitution, to see that
notion—that women and men are persons of equal stature—I’d like them to see that is a basic
principle of our society.”); Brown et al., supra note 64; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a
Renewed Equal Rights Amendment: Now More Than Ever, 37 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 569, 579
(2014) (“[A]n ERA would provide an inspiration and impetus for public policy and a powerful
symbolic support for women’s equality at all social levels at the apex of the legal system in a
culture in which law has power and meaning, and sometimes leads.”); Neuwirth, supra note 75
(“[A]mending the Constitution to include sex equality as a fundamental human right will send a
clear public message that women are no longer to be treated as second-class citizens. The
intentional omission of women has perpetuated a lack of respect for women and engendered a
culture that allows sexual harassment to continue unchecked.”). Although Justice Ginsburg
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could also reinforce and strengthen government’s and society’s resolve
to enforce existing laws and adopt new laws to achieve women’s
equality.78
Women’s equality is undoubtedly a compelling interest of
constitutional magnitude. The legal and policy reforms to which ERA
supporters aspire are promising, if they could be implemented.
Regrettably, the ERA would probably not facilitate such reforms, but
rather, as explained below,79 would likely make them more difficult to
pursue.
III. THE ERA’S LIKELY EFFECTS
A. The Likelihood of Strict Scrutiny
The ERA provides that “Equality of rights under the law shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of
sex.”80 This would effectively ban intentional government
discrimination against women in legislation or executive action. The
ERA probably would not ban sex discrimination absolutely, but would
likely subject such discrimination to strict scrutiny, which, as with race
discrimination, would require government to justify sex discrimination
as necessary to achieve a compelling interest.81 Strict scrutiny differs
from the intermediate scrutiny in at least four important ways. First, the
government’s interest must be “compelling” and not just “important.”82
supported adding the ERA to the Constitution, it should be acknowledged that she believed that
the process would need to begin anew because of the congressional deadline on the ERA that
expired; Ariane de Vogue, Ruth Bader Ginsburg says deadline to ratify Equal Rights Amendment
has expired: ‘I’d like it to start over’, CNN (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/
02/10/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-equal-rights-amendment/index.html (Responding to a
question from a moderator at a Georgetown Law event, Justice Ginsburg said she “would like to
see a new beginning” for the ERA and would “like it to start over.” Referring to comments she
made at a separate event at Georgetown in 2019, the article also quotes Justice Ginsburg as saying,
“I hope someday it will be put back in the political hopper, starting over again, collecting the
necessary number of states to ratify it.”).
78. Brown et al., supra note 64.
79. See infra Sections III.B.3 and III.C.2.
80. See supra text accompanying note 49.
81. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989).
82. Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that
“racial classifications . . . must be analyzed . . . under strict scrutiny . . . . [S]uch classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests”) with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)) (requiring the state to show, under intermediate
scrutiny “at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives
and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives”).
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Second, the means used must be “necessary” or “narrowly tailored,”
whereas intermediate scrutiny requires only that the means be
“substantially related” to achieving the government’s interest.83 Third,
strict scrutiny only permits remedying discrimination if it can be
identified “with particularity”; mere generalized statistics indicating
historical or “societal” discrimination are insufficient.84 By contrast,
intermediate scrutiny has permitted the government to remedy past
discrimination against women based on generalized, society-wide
statistics of sex inequality.85 Fourth, strict scrutiny does not permit
quotas.86 Intermediate scrutiny does appear to accept quotas, at least
those that are entirely for one sex. Consider that single-sex settings
such as restrooms, locker rooms, prisons, dorm rooms, sports, etc.,
amount to exclusive quotas for each sex. Similarly, although the Court
invalidated the Virginia Military Institute’s all-male admissions quota,
it did so for reasons unique to the case, indicating that the Court was
not invalidating all single-sex schools.87 Given that the Court upholds
quotas that reserve particular settings exclusively for one sex, it seems
likely that the Court would, under intermediate scrutiny, uphold milder
quotas that merely guarantee some percentage to each sex.

83. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
84. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 485 (applying strict scrutiny to a race-based measure, the
Court stated that neither “broad-brush assumptions of historical discrimination” nor “societal
discrimination” suffice to establish a compelling interest. Instead, strict scrutiny requires the
government to demonstrate with particularity the discriminatory actions that a discriminatory
preference is expected to compensate for).
85. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498, 506–510 (1975)) (upholding law allowing women to exclude more low-earning years
for social security retirement benefits because “[r]eduction of the disparity in economic condition
between men and women caused by the long history of discrimination against women [is] an
important governmental objective”); see also Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974) (upholding
state law allowing widows, not widowers, a property tax exemption because, “[w]hether from
overt discrimination or from the socialization process,” such women faced more difficult barriers
in the job market than widowers).
86. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (citing Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke 438 U.S.
265, 315–17 (1978)) (reinforcing that to satisfy the “narrowly tailored” requirement of strict
scrutiny “a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system . . . . [A] university may
consider race . . . only as a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file . . . . [U]niversities cannot establish
quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate
admissions tracks”).
87. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 n.7, 535 (1996) (affirming that single-sex education provides
“pedagogical benefits to at least some students . . . and that reality is uncontested in this
litigation.” Justice Ginsburg goes on to state that creating a diverse array of educational options
can justify the existence of a single-sex program if that is in fact the motive behind the design. She
also clarifies that the court is addressing “specifically and only an educational opportunity
recognized . . . as unique, an opportunity available only at Virginia’s premier military institute,
the Commonwealth’s sole single-sex public university or college.”).

FORDE-MAZRUI_03_17_21 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

3/17/2021 6:35 PM

WHY THE ERA WOULD ENDANGER WOMEN’S EQUALITY

19

Unlike intermediate scrutiny, then, strict scrutiny virtually always
invalidates the discriminations to which it is applied, especially
discriminations against historically disadvantaged groups.88 It is highly
unlikely that any discrimination against women would survive strict
scrutiny. Accordingly, the ERA would prohibit intentional
discrimination by government against women in hiring, pay and
promotions, by public schools and public institutions of higher
education, and by government discrimination through harassment or
violence.
Why strict scrutiny would likely apply to state-sponsored sex
discrimination under the ERA warrants explanation as strict scrutiny
is a central premise of this article’s claims. One cannot predict with
certainty what test the Court would apply to sex distinctions under the
ERA. That many ERA supporters assumed that strict scrutiny would
apply89 does not necessitate that result. The Court could choose an
approach to state-sponsored sex discriminations from among several
options, including absolute, strict, intermediate, or rational basis
scrutiny. By absolute scrutiny, I mean a categorical ban on all statesponsored discriminations on account of sex with no exception.
Alternatively, the Court might apply absolute scrutiny with specific
exceptions, such as for discriminations based on physical characteristics
unique to one sex, as a few states have done under state constitutional
law.90 Strict or intermediate scrutiny has already been explained.
88. Legal scholar Gerald Gunther famously described strict scrutiny as “strict in theory, fatal
in fact.” The Court denies that strict scrutiny is always fatal (see Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237), and
it has upheld race-based affirmative action in higher education under strict scrutiny. See Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208
(2016). Many observers believe the Court would not uphold affirmative action for remedial
purposes. See Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, Affirmative Action after Grutter: Reflections on a
Tortured Death, Imagining a Humanity-Affirming Reincarnation, 63 LA. L. REV. 705, 710–11
(2003) (arguing that the Court should use affirmative action as a remedial tool and listing reasons
why continued pressure is needed to convince the courts to do so). Observers also believe its
future in higher education is in serious doubt since Justice Kennedy left the Court. See Scott
Jaschik, The Impact of Justice Kennedy, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (June 28, 2018),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/06/28/departure-justice-kennedy-could-erasesupreme-court-majority-backing-consideration (“[Justice Kennedy] wrote key decisions on
affirmative action and other topics that matter to colleges. Kennedy’s departure could erase the
Supreme Court majority backing the right of colleges to consider race in admissions.”).
89. See Gail Heriot, The Equal Rights Amendment: Back for an Encore Performance, 9
ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 29, 29 (2008) (“Leaders of the ratification
movement argued that the amendment would be interpreted by the courts to impose a strict
scrutiny standard on all laws that discriminate on the basis of sex like that already imposed on
racially discriminatory laws.”). See also supra text accompanying notes 37 and 74.
90. See Davis, supra note 74, at 433 (noting, for example, that Washington State adopted an
absolute scrutiny test with exceptions for characteristics that distinguish between the sexes).
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Finally, the Court could apply rational basis scrutiny, which would
uphold state-sponsored sex discrimination unless a challenger can
prove that the discriminatory law does not rationally serve any
legitimate governmental interest.
For several somewhat overlapping reasons, the Court is likely to
apply strict scrutiny or, worse, absolute scrutiny to state-sponsored sex
discrimination. First, it is implausible that the Court would apply
rational basis scrutiny because that scrutiny is typically applied to
discriminations that are not constitutionally suspect. Such a result
would subject state-sponsored sex discrimination to a less exacting
standard than is currently applied under the Equal Protection Clause
and would instead apply the standard applicable to non-suspect
classifications, such as regulations of television cable companies91 and
opticians.92 It also seems highly unlikely that the Court would apply
intermediate scrutiny as that would mean that the ERA would make
no change regarding how the Court analyzes laws that discriminate on
account of sex. The Court already applies intermediate scrutiny to sex
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, so applying the
same scrutiny under the ERA means that the ERA would merely
duplicate existing law rather than changing it. Thus, the Court is likely
to apply either strict scrutiny or absolute scrutiny.
Other reasons support the likelihood that the Court would apply
strict scrutiny over a more lenient test. First, the text of the ERA is
categorical. Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, which speaks of
“equal protection” in general terms, which could imply some flexibility
for interest balancing, the ERA specifically bans the denial or
abridgment of rights “on account of sex,” without exception.93 Nor does
it limit the ban to particular contexts, such as public education,
employment or public contracting,94 but instead applies across the
91. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
92. F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993).
93. See 118 Cong. Rec. 9568 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) [hereinafter Statement] (“[T]he
basic principle on which the Amendment rests may be stated shortly: sex should not be a factor in
determining the legal rights of men or of women.”); see also Brake, supra note 14, at 956–58
(arguing that a string of Supreme Court decisions “may indicate the Court’s willingness to
reconsider strict scrutiny for gender classifications in the future” (citing Miss. Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 154 (1994); Harris v.
Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring))).
94. Several states have amended their state constitutions to prohibit discriminating against
or granting preferential treatment to individuals on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in public employment, public education, and public contracting. See, e.g., CAL.
CONST. Sec. 31; NEB. CONST. Art. I-30; OKLA. CONST. Art. 2, Sec. 36A; MICH. CONST. Art. I,
Sec. 26; ARIZ. CONST. Art. 2, Sec. 36. Gail Hariot suggests a similar scope for the ERA. Heriot,
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board to “equal of rights,” implying no exceptions.95
Second, the Court’s approach to racial equality claims under the
Equal Protection Clause suggests how the Court would approach sex
equality claims under the ERA. The Court views the central purpose
of the Equal Protection Clause as prohibiting race discrimination.
Indeed, Justice Scalia interpreted the Equal Protection Clause’s
application to race as so clear as to constitute a textual prohibition of
race discrimination.96 Likewise, the central purpose of the ERA is
plainly to prohibit sex discrimination, a purpose expressed by its text.
“Sex” would thus likely be a suspect classification under the ERA and
sex-based distinctions would be subject to strict scrutiny.
It is true that the Court has interpreted “equal protection” to apply
only intermediate scrutiny to sex discrimination, so one might believe
that current doctrine is more useful to predict the impact of the ERA
than equal protection doctrine as applied to race. But the lesser scrutiny
applied to sex is likely due to differences between race and sex that has
led the Court to tolerate sex distinctions—many of which benefit
women—more than the Court tolerates race distinctions. The ERA
would likely eliminate or minimize such differences. The Court has not
explained fully why sex discrimination receives a lesser level of scrutiny
than race discrimination, but the Court in United States v. Virginia
offered some explanation:
The heightened [intermediate] review standard our precedent
establishes does not make sex a proscribed classification. Supposed
“inherent differences” are no longer accepted as a ground for race
or national origin classifications. Physical differences between men
and women, however, are enduring: “[T]he two sexes are not
fungible; a community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different
from a community composed of both.”
supra note 89 (proposing that a new ERA should apply only to public education, employment
and contracting).
95. Brown et al., supra note 64, at 872, 887, 896 (explaining that the proponents of the ERA
have always advocated that the ERA is a “broad mandate for the unified treatment of men and
women” and have defined “rights” to include “all forms of privileges, immunities, benefits and
responsibilities of citizens.” However, the authors argue that the ERA would not foreclose
legislatures from “continu[ing] to classify on the basis of real differences in the life situations and
characteristics” of individuals and would enable Congress to pass laws based on physical
characteristics unique to one sex or laws based on privacy considerations.).
96. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 n.1 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court’s suggestion . . . that adherence to tradition would require us to uphold
laws against interracial marriage is entirely wrong. Any tradition in that case was contradicted by
a text — an Equal Protection Clause that explicitly establishes racial equality as a constitutional
value.” (emphasis in original, cleaned up)).
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“Inherent differences” between men and women, we have come to
appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of
the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an
individual’s opportunity.97

The Court thus justified strict scrutiny for racial classifications
based on race being a proscribed classification, i.e., virtually always
forbidden; whereas intermediate scrutiny for sex classifications accepts
that sex is sometimes an acceptable ground for differential treatment,
albeit not when used to perpetuate the subordinated status of women.
I have offered the following additional observations for why race
currently receives higher scrutiny than sex:
The greater suspectness accorded racial over sex-based
classifications has not been clearly explained, but it may reflect a
perception by the Court that discrimination against minorities has
been more invidious, that the insularity of minority communities
makes empathy with their interests less likely to develop on the part
of the majority, that their small population undermines their ability
to protect themselves in the political process, and that “real
differences” between the sexes make it more likely that there are
legitimate reasons to differentiate on the basis of sex than on the
basis of race.98

The foregoing observations may explain the Court’s current
approach to sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The
ERA’s express and categorical prohibition of discrimination on
account of sex would, however, likely eliminate the Court’s
ambivalence toward applying strict scrutiny to sex discrimination. The
ERA, by its express terms, prohibits government from discriminating
“on account of sex,” period. As such, the Court would have difficulty
explaining why it should subject sex discrimination to a more
permissive standard than the strict scrutiny it applies to race
discrimination. Indeed, given that the ERA’s prohibition of sex
discrimination is more textually categorical than the general language
of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court may find that absolute
scrutiny is more justified than strict scrutiny under the ERA, let alone
intermediate scrutiny.99

97. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
98. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 281, 321 (2011).
99. The Equal Protection Clause reads “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
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Still other doctrinal indicators tend to predict strict scrutiny for sex
discriminations analyzed under the ERA. In Frontiero v. Richardson, a
four-justice plurality of the Court applied strict scrutiny to a sex
discriminating law.100 Three other justices concurred in the judgement
but did not join the strict scrutiny analysis by the four-justice plurality
because they believed that the ERA, whose ratification was then
pending in the states, would compel application of strict scrutiny.101
Thus, seven justices believed that strict scrutiny should apply to sex
discrimination, four under the Equal Protection Clause and three if the
pending ERA were ratified.
Virginia also supports applying strict scrutiny for sex discrimination
under the ERA. The Court explained in that case, as quoted above,102
that sex only receives intermediate scrutiny because sex, unlike race, is
not a proscribed classification.103 The ERA would make sex a
proscribed classification, implying that sex-based distinctions should be
treated as presumptively unconstitutional as race-based distinctions.
The Court would also have difficulty explaining why a constitutional
amendment explicitly proscribing sex discrimination would not
demonstrate a level of skepticism for sex discrimination equal or close
to the high standard of scrutiny for race discrimination. Although race
discrimination is not expressly prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause, all justices agree that the Equal Protection Clause’s primary
concern is race discrimination. The Court’s application of strict scrutiny
to race discrimination, based on an understanding that race
discrimination is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment,104

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” US CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The proposed ERA
reads in part “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or any State on account of sex.” H.R.J. Res. 208, 92nd Cong. (1971).
100. 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
101. Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring).
102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
103. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (noting that sex is not a
“proscribed classification”). By “proscribed” classification, the Court in Virginia seems to mean
that race, unlike sex, is virtually always prohibited as a basis of classification, whereas sex, though
generally improper, can be used for equality-advancing purposes.
104. Justice Thomas’s opposition to virtually all state-sponsored race distinctions is well
known. The views of the other originalists on the Court, namely, Justices Gorsuch and possibly
Barrett, regarding race distinctions remain to be seen. Court observers plausibly predict, however,
that they will be very skeptical of state-sponsored uses of race, including for so-called benign
purposes, such as affirmative action. Vinay Harpalani, The Supreme Court and the Future of
Affirmative Action, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/thesupreme-court-and-the-future-of-affirmative-action/ (“The Court now has a solid conservative
majority, with three of the Justices having previously voted to strike down race-conscious
admissions policies . . . . Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh are also widely thought to
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suggests that strict scrutiny would apply to sex discrimination if it were
explicitly prohibited by the Equal Rights Amendment.
Applying strict scrutiny to sex discrimination is also supported by
the Court’s famous Carolene Products footnote four, especially its first
paragraph:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth. [citing First Amendment cases]
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
[citing cases involving the rights to vote, disseminate information,
organize, assemble peaceably]
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or national . . .
or racial minorities[;] whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry . . . .105

Sex discrimination does not comfortably satisfy the second and
third paragraphs because, respectively, women have legal access to the
political process and women are neither insular nor a minority,
although women have certainly been the object of prejudice. The ERA

oppose such policies. Barring an unexpected vote from one of these Justices, a cert grant [of
Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard] will likely mean the end of affirmative action in
university admissions. Even if the Court does not abrogate the compelling interest in diversity
altogether, it could still require universities to fully exhaust race-neutral alternatives to attain this
diversity. This would make Grutter’s narrow tailoring standard virtually impossible to meet and
effectively accomplish the same end.”); How Amy Coney Barrett Would Reshape the Court and
the Country, POLITICO MAG. (Sept. 26, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/
2020/09/26/amy-barrett-scotus-legal-experts-422028 (Professor William Araiza of the Brooklyn
School of Law reasons that with the confirmation of Justice Barrett, the solid 6-3 conservative
majority bloc could lead Chief Justice Roberts to “embrace more aggressive transformation in
the law” and “trigger change across an entire range of issues” including affirmative action.
Professor Mark Tushnet of Harvard Law School predicts that the Court, with the addition of
Justice Barrett, will hold race-based affirmative action policies at public universities
unconstitutional).
105. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added).
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would, however, place sex discrimination firmly within the first
paragraph because it would make, “on its face,” a right against
discrimination “on account of sex” an express constitutional right. The
Court has not consistently followed Carolene Products footnote four so
strict scrutiny under the ERA is not guaranteed simply because sex
discrimination would be expressly prohibited.106 However, the Court’s
approach to express rights has often been stricter than strict scrutiny,
categorically protecting certain rights.107 The ERA’s express protection
against discrimination on account of sex is thus probably more likely to
receive some level of strict or absolute scrutiny than the more flexible
balancing test reflected in intermediate scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.
Originalism also supports strict or absolute scrutiny under the
ERA. The prevailing approach among originalists today is to interpret
constitutional text according to its public meaning at the time of the
text’s ratification. “At its most basic,” Professor Keith Whittington
explains, “originalism argues that the discoverable public meaning of
the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption should be regarded
as authoritative for purposes of later constitutional interpretation.”108
The text, interpreted in accordance with evidence of contemporary
public meaning, could support an absolute ban on sex distinctions, but
at the very least it would support strict scrutiny.
First, originalists typically prioritize constitutional text. The ERA
explicitly prohibits abridgement or denial of rights “on account of sex,”
so an originalist may well interpret its public meaning to be that the
government is categorically prohibited from using sex to make legal
distinctions. The ERA does not expressly admit of any exception for
denial or abridgement of equal rights on account of sex. Such a strict
reading would likely invalidate all sex-conscious state efforts to
promote women’s equality.
Contemporary evidence during the 1970s, the primary period of the
ERA’s ratification, supports this interpretation. ERA supporters
claimed that the ERA would result in strict scrutiny or something more
106. Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong about Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 227, 228–29 (2006) (explaining that only two of the first ten amendments referred to
in Carolene Products Footnote Four have triggered strict scrutiny at the Supreme Court level: the
First and Fifth Amendments).
107. Id. at 229–32 (explaining that the Court has interpreted most of the rights found in the
Bill of Rights according to “categorical rules” rather than by applying strict scrutiny).
108. Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375,
377 (2013).
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absolute.109 After sex discrimination began receiving intermediate
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, ERA supporters began
insisting that strict scrutiny was necessary to afford women full
equality.110
Although it is unlikely that applying strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause reflects the Fourteenth Amendment’s original public
meaning (strict scrutiny was not developed until the mid-twentieth
century), strict scrutiny may accurately reflect the public meaning of
the ERA—considering that ERA supporters sought heightened
scrutiny as a goal for the amendment. Furthermore, originalists tend to
support judicially-crafted tests, such as strict scrutiny, when the test
promotes results consistent with the original public meaning.111
109. See Brown et al., supra note 64, at 900 (“The courts will have to maintain a strict scrutiny
of [sex] classifications if the guarantees of the Amendment are to be effectively secured.”); Davis,
supra note 74, at 422 (“[T]he amendment would result in strict scrutiny for governmental policies
that discriminate based on sex and lead to a greater consideration of the particular impact of
decisions on women even in the private sector.”) Wharton, supra note 44, at 1202 (“In the
1970s . . . . it seemed possible that either through judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or ratification of the proposed Federal ERA, sex equality
would receive rigorous protection under the Federal Constitution.”).
110. E.g., Stephens, supra note 37, at 411 (pointing to Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen
v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), as a recent example of where the application of the intermediate
scrutiny standard operated to uphold a law that reflected the sexist assumption that a child born
out of wedlock was the sole responsibility of the mother, which is exactly the type of sex-based
stereotype intermediate scrutiny is supposed to strike down); id. at 426–27 (“Women continue to
be treated unequally under the law . . . because the intermediate scrutiny standard permits gender
discrimination . . . .”).
111. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Interpretation and Construction: Originalism and its
Discontents, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 101 (2011) (arguing that originalists judges seek to
interpret the Constitution as it was understood by the people who ratified it, but in some cases,
where the drafters of an amendment included language with “a fixed meaning but a floating set
of applications”, as is the case with the Equal Protection Clause, this approach cannot be strictly
adhered to. Instead, the judge has to contemplate “whether a particular practice is out of step
with current views about equality.” As a result, judges have developed various tests, including
strict scrutiny, to determine if a law adheres to the People’s intention when they ratified an
amendment with “flexible” and “adjusting” constraints. Reaching the “ratifier-approved answer”
is not the sole motivation for creating tests like scrutiny test, but it is probably the most attractive
to originalists.); see also Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation And Construction, 34 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 65, 70 (2011) (explaining that when the text of an amendment is “vague” or
“ambiguous”, originalists choose from a number of constitutional construction methods based on
their personal “normative reasons” for preferring originalist interpretation to begin with. If an
originalist judge’s primary motivation is to “protect the background rights retained by the
people”, the judge will likely favor rules of construction that contain a “presumption of liberty
that places the burden on the government to justify its restrictions on liberty as necessary and
proper.”). Barnett’s description of originalist decision making closely parallels the strict scrutiny
test which requires the government to demonstrate that any infringement of equal protection
guarantees be “necessary” or “narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling interest.” See supra
note 38 and accompanying text. See also Fallon, infra note 117, at 1334–35 n.358 (“The history of
strict judicial scrutiny is a case study in judicial efforts to implement the Constitution through
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Applying strict scrutiny would arguably advance the ERA’s categorical
ban on discrimination “on account of sex.” Originalist justices have
acquiesced in strict scrutiny to enforce a near-categorical ban on race
distinctions which, they believe, reflects the Equal Protection Clause’s
original public meaning.112 If anything, justices that strongly encourage
an originalist approach to interpreting equal protection tend to favor
an especially stringent form of strict scrutiny to presumptively invalid
classifications.113
If the ERA were ratified, the decades it has taken to ratify it would
complicate the originalist analysis. The public meaning of “[e]quality of
rights . . . shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of sex” may
mean something different today than it did to the majority of ratifying
states in the 1970s. The difficulty of interpreting the public meaning of
constitutional amendments ratified over decades lends support to
Professor Sai Prakash’s114 and then-Professor and again Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg’s115 conclusions that constitutional amendments, to be
doctrinal tests that at best approximate, without perfectly expressing, the historical or semantic
meaning of constitutional language.”).
112. Justices Scalia and Thomas, advocates of originalism, both accepted application of strict
scrutiny to race-based classifications, albeit an especially strict version of it. City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520–21 (1989) (Scalia J., concurring) (citing Lee v. Washington,
390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968)) (“only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life
and limb,” such as a prison race riot, could justify separating people by race); see also Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (citing Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)) (agreeing with the proposition that a “pressing public necessity
may sometimes justify the existence of racial discrimination”).
113. Croson, 488 U.S. at 520–21 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority
“that strict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classification by race”; Bollinger, 539
U.S. at 379–80 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority should have applied a
more stringent version of strict scrutiny to evaluate whether University of Michigan’s
consideration of race in admissions was narrowly tailored to achieve their stated interest); cf.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221–22 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (objecting to the creation
and application of the intermediate scrutiny standard in a context that does not justify an elevated
level of review and arguing that the Court should stick to the dual framework of strict scrutiny
versus rational basis analysis for Equal Protection Clause issues).
114. See Prakash, supra note 2, at 1295 (stating that, despite his support for the ERA, “the
1972 ERA is no longer viable. As noted earlier, the Constitution is best read as imposing a
reasonable time constraint between congressional proposal and ratification”).
115. Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed support for an inherent time limit on the ratification of
constitutional amendments as a law professor in 1978 and reiterated that view as applied to the
ERA as a Justice in 2020. See Extending the Ratification Period for the Proposed Equal Rights
Amendment: Hearing on H.J. Res. 638 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 121-22 (1978) (statement of Prof. Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Columbia Law School) (stating that “[i]mplicit in Article V is the requirement that
ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment occur within some reasonable time” and that
“even 20 years would constitute a rational, constitutional time period.”), quoted in Prakash, supra
note 2, at 1295 & nn.397–98. See de Vogue, supra note 77 (reporting, after Virginia’s vote to ratify
the ERA, that Justice Ginsburg believes the original ERA has expired).
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valid, must be ratified within a reasonable period of time, including the
ERA. Regardless, originalist evidence supports strong protection
against sex discrimination under the ERA, whether under strict
scrutiny or a more absolute ban.
That most states that have constitutional guarantees of sex equality
apply strict scrutiny to sex discrimination116 further supports that the
ERA’s public meaning is that sex should virtually never be a basis of
state-sponsored discrimination. Also, originalist approaches to
constitutional interpretation tend to identify infringements on rights in
categorical terms, i.e., a law is or is not constitutional by reference to
public meaning rather than by reference to how such a law would fare
under a scrutiny test.117 That might explain why Justice Thomas
supports virtually absolute colorblindness for race, as did Justice
Scalia.118 Thus, two prominent originalists believe that a constitutional
provision guaranteeing racial equality permits virtually no distinctions
by race. Therefore, originalists may well interpret the ERA’s public
116. See, e.g., Wharton, supra note 44, at 1240 (“[M]ost courts have interpreted their ERAs
as requiring higher justification for gender-based classifications than the intermediate standard of
review used by the Supreme Court in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause.”); Lisa Baldez et
al., Does the U.S. Constitution Need an Equal Rights Amendment?, 35 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 243,
265–67 (2006) (“[T]he presence of an ERA significantly increases the likelihood of a court
applying a higher standard of law, which in turn significantly increases the likelihood of a decision
favoring the equality claim.”). There is not complete consensus among states on applying strict
scrutiny to sex discrimination under state constitutional ERAs. See Wharton, supra note 44, at
1240 n.179 (citing cases from Connecticut, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire and Texas where strict scrutiny was applied in sex discrimination lawsuits). Although
most states apply strict scrutiny, some apply a kind of intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 1242 (“[A]
minority of states assess the validity of sex-based classifications under their equality guarantees
using a standard . . . much like the federal intermediate standard of review” including Virginia,
Utah, Alaska and New Jersey.) Others apply an absolute prohibition of sex-based distinctions.
See JENNIFER FRIESEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS
AND DEFENSES § 3-2(e)(1) (3d ed. 2000) (naming Pennsylvania, Colorado, Washington,
Maryland and New Mexico as “absolutist”).
117. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1270, 1293 (2007)
(describing that, before the 1960s, the Court’s constitutional interpretation of fundamental rights
required a “categorical prohibition” of any infringement on them and that strict scrutiny was not
developed as an analytical framework until the early 1960s). See also District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584–85, 627, 635 (2008) (writing for the majority, Justice Scalia failed to
apply a scrutiny test and instead interpreted the original meaning of the Second Amendment to
hold that a law which forbids an individual from possessing a firearm in the home is
unconstitutional).
118. See supra note 112. Despite their strong aversion to any state-sponsored race
distinctions, including for remedial or diversity purposes, Justices Scalia and Thomas have
acknowledged narrow circumstances in which governmental race discrimination would survive
judicial scrutiny. As Professor Richard Fallon also observes, other conservative justices also
preferred a strict version of strict scrutiny. See Fallon, supra note 117, at 1307–08 n.233 (citing
Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy and Scalia complaining when the majority applied strict scrutiny in
a manner that the justices thought was too deferential).
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meaning as prohibiting all or virtually all sex distinctions under a
standard that might be called “super-strict” scrutiny—if not absolute
scrutiny.
Absolute or some sort of super-strict scrutiny would only
compound my concerns with the ERA, discussed below. Those
concerns are premised on the Court applying strict scrutiny with the
effect of prohibiting virtually all sex distinctions even for women’s
equality-advancing purposes. An absolute prohibition would guarantee
that effect. Despite the real possibility of absolute scrutiny, I expect that
the Court will apply strict scrutiny to sex distinctions under the ERA.
First, the Court applies strict not absolute scrutiny to racial
classifications, permitting some race distinctions,119 even though race is
the most suspect of equal protection concerns. Second, the Court would
likely be influenced by cultural norms that accept some sex distinctions,
leading the Court to apply a test that could allow for narrow exceptions.
The rest of this article’s analysis assumes that the Court would apply
strict scrutiny to state-sponsored, sex-motivated laws and actions rather
than ban them outright.
B. Self-Executing Effects (Without Legislative Implementation)
1. The (Redundant) Good: No Government Discrimination
Against Women
This section considers direct effects of the ERA, i.e., from its selfexecuting operation without congressional implementation, that are
promising for women’s equality. The caveat is that these benefits are,
essentially, already achieved under the Equal Protection Clause. As
argued in the previous section, the ERA would likely result in the
Court applying strict scrutiny to state-sponsored sex discrimination.
The ERA’s tangible benefit to women then is that it would make such

119. Despite the difficulty of satisfying strict scrutiny, the Court has permitted the use of race
as one of many factors in college and law school admissions. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136
S. Ct. 2198, 2210 (2016) (internal citation omitted) (“[A]dmissions officers can consider race as a
positive feature of a minority student’s application . . . race is but a factor of a factor of a factor in
the holistic-review calculus.”); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (“the Equal
Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions
decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body”). Of course, the conservative justices that remain on the Court would have
invalidated those race-based programs and the addition of conservative justices Gorsuch,
Kavanaugh and Barrett leaves the permissibility of race-based affirmative action in serious doubt.
Likewise, the more conservative Court may, as discussed above, apply a categorical ban on sex
distinctions under the ERA.
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discrimination very difficult to survive constitutional challenge. In
evaluating the potential benefits of the ERA, however, we should
recognize that discrimination against women is already presumptively
unconstitutional under current equal protection doctrine. As explained
previously, the Court subjects governmental sex discrimination to
intermediate scrutiny, which invalidates virtually all discriminations
against women. The reason is that intermediate scrutiny is unlikely ever
to find that discriminating against women substantially serves
important governmental interests. The ERA’s purported benefits for
women is thus mitigated because the ERA’s guarantees are redundant
with existing law.
This is not to say that raising the level of scrutiny from intermediate
to strict makes no difference—it certainly does. The main difference,
however, is that under strict scrutiny, “benign” sex discrimination, i.e.,
discrimination for the benefit of women, would likely be struck down
more often than under intermediate scrutiny. As explained below,120 the
ERA would likely prohibit discrimination against men even more than
does current equal protection law, and the Court would likely interpret
laws and policies designed to advance women’s equality as
discrimination against men.
2. The Bad: No Application to Private Discrimination, Disparate
Impact, Pregnancy or Abortion
The ERA would fail to address three sources of sex inequality that
ERA supporters aspire to correct. First, the ERA would probably not
apply to (or allow Congress to correct for) discrimination by private
actors, such as companies and individuals. Rather, it is clearly limited to
discrimination by federal and state actors: “Equality of rights under the
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on
account of sex.”121 Accordingly, employment concerns, such as
discrimination in pay, hiring and promotion, harassment, and lack of
maternity leave in private companies, organizations, and private
colleges and universities, would remain constitutional.122 Nor would

120. See infra Sections III.B.3 and III.C.2.
121. See Statement, supra note 93 and accompanying text; see also Brown et al., supra note
64, at 905 (explaining that ERA would only apply to state action).
122. Many of these concerns are currently prohibited under statutory law. See supra section
I.A. But to the extent ERA supporters believe we need an ERA to make such prohibitions
permanent and to prohibit other forms of sex discrimination in the private sector, the ERA would
not advance this goal.
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the ERA prohibit violence against women or any other mistreatment
of women by private individuals.
Second, the ERA would likely permit laws and policies that have
an unintentional disparate impact against women. In Washington v.
Davis, the Court held that the central purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause is to prohibit invidious racial discrimination.123
Such
124
discrimination must, at a minimum, be purposeful. As previously
explained,125 the Court in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney held that purposeful discrimination requires that the
government took action “because of,” and “not merely in spite of,” its
adverse effect on a protected group.126 Laws and government policies
that have a disparate impact are not subject to rigorous judicial scrutiny
unless the challenger proves that the government intended the
disparate effect.127
It seems likely that the Court would interpret discrimination under
the ERA similarly, that only purposeful discrimination triggers the
amendment’s protections. The Court has repeatedly applied Davis, a
unanimous decision on the meaning of discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause, without any suggestion that it would be
reconsidered.128 The Court in Davis considered purposefulness as
inherent in the concept of discrimination, a view it would in all
likelihood apply to the meaning of discrimination under the ERA.129
The Court in Davis also expressed concern that interpreting the Equal

123. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of
race.”).
124. See id. (“A purpose to discriminate must be present which may be proven by
systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the proscribed race or by unequal application of the
lawtosuchanextentastoshowintentional discrimination.” (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398,
403–04 (1945))).
125. See discussion supra Section I.B.
126. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory
purpose’ . . . . implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group.”).
127. Id.
128. E.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 330 (2014) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (noting that the Court has decided “dozens of cases confirming the exceptionless
nature of the Washington v. Davis rule . . . . “); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“[O]ur
decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with
discriminatory purpose.” (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976))).
129. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976) (“As an initial matter, we have
difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral qualification for employment is
nevertheless racially discriminatory . . . .”)

FORDE-MAZRUI_03_17_21 (DO NOT DELETE)

32

3/17/2021 6:35 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 16

Protection Clause to presumptively forbid laws that have a disparate
impact without proof of intent would unduly involve the courts in
reviewing such legislation.130 A similar effect could result from judicial
scrutiny of all laws that disparately impact women. Thus, there is good
reason to expect that the Court would interpret discrimination under
the ERA in the same way as discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause in that only purposeful sex discrimination would implicate the
ERA.
Third, the ERA would fail to expressly protect pregnancy or
abortion rights. Nor is it likely that reproductive rights will be protected
through judicial interpretation either. In 1974, in Geduldig v. Aiello, the
Court held that, under the Equal Protection Clause, discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy is not discrimination on the basis of sex.131 In
1976, in General Electric Company v. Gilbert, the Court extended that
reasoning—that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination—
to Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.132 In 1978, Congress
repudiated the Court’s statutory interpretation of “sex” in Gilbert by
passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which defines “sex” in Title
VII to include “pregnancy, childbirth and related medical
conditions.”133 Though the Court now treats pregnancy discrimination
as sex discrimination for Title VII purposes,134 the Court has never
suggested that it was mistaken in interpreting sex discrimination for
constitutional purposes as not including pregnancy discrimination.
Moreover, the Court has never interpreted abortion restrictions as sex
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, but rather it has
viewed such restrictions as burdening a woman’s fundamental liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause.135

130. See id. at 247–48 (expressing concern that many laws with an economic impact would be
subject to judicial review).
131. See 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974) (holding that state law disability insurance denial of
pregnancy coverage did not discriminate on the basis of sex under the Equal Protection Clause).
132. See 429 U.S. 125, 145–46 (1976) (holding that a “disability-benefits plan does not
violate Title VII because of its failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities.”).
133. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (The Act extends protection
from employment discrimination to “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”).
134. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 685 (1983)
(“The Pregnancy Discrimination Act has now made clear that, for all Title VII purposes,
discrimination based on a woman’s pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex.”).
135. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973) (agreeing with appellant that a woman’s
decision to terminate her pregnancy is a matter of personal liberty, which is a right embodied in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 834 (1992); June Med. Svcs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2013, 2014 (2020).
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Consequently, the ERA is unlikely to change the Court’s
constitutional interpretation of sex discrimination to include
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or abortion. The ERA does
not define sex (at all, let alone to include reproductive rights), and there
is no reason to believe that the Court would interpret sex differently
under the ERA than it does under the Equal Protection Clause.
Accordingly, laws or policies that discriminate against, or fail to
accommodate, pregnant women or that unduly burden women’s access
to abortion likely would not violate the ERA.136
3. The Ugly: The ERA Would Likely Prohibit Affirmative Efforts
to Advance Women’s Equality
This section makes the most important claim of this article. The
ERA’s most harmful, self-executing effect is that it would likely
prohibit government from enacting laws or adopting policies designed
to advance women’s equality. The reasons are two-fold. First, as
previously explained,137 the ERA would likely raise the scrutiny
applied to sex discrimination from intermediate scrutiny to strict
scrutiny. Second, as explained below, the Court would then likely apply
strict scrutiny to sex-conscious laws designed to advance women’s
equality, not just sex-conscious laws that harm women.
Many ERA supporters would likely applaud my prediction that the
Court would apply strict scrutiny to state-sponsored sex discrimination
because that would make such discrimination against women even
more constitutionally vulnerable than under the current intermediate
scrutiny standard.138 If strict scrutiny would apply only to laws that
harm women’s equality, support for the ERA would be justified. The
danger for women’s equality, however, is that the Court would likely
interpret the ERA to apply strict scrutiny even to laws and policies
designed to support women. The Court has interpreted equality rights
for decades139 in a formalistic, symmetrical way that views any benefit
to one group as discrimination against the group not benefited. For
example, consider race. The Court views affirmative efforts to increase
minority representation in higher education, government contracting,
136. See Davis supra note 74.
137. See supra Section III.B.1.
138. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
139. Since 1976, the Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to apply intermediate
scrutiny to discrimination against both sexes. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Since
1989, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to all racial classifications including for the benefit of
racial minorities. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989).
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employment, and political participation as discrimination against
whites.140 The Court thus applies strict scrutiny to all race-conscious
government decision-making even when intended to advance racial
equality.141 The effect, essentially, is that government must largely
ignore race and racial inequality—it must be “color blind.”
The Court’s skeptical view that laws designed to benefit racial
minorities are as “suspect” as laws designed to benefit whites reflects
the Court’s anti-classification approach to equal protection. The anticlassification approach views the constitutional problem as classifying
people by their race.142 By contrast, the anti-subordination approach
views the constitutional problem as the impact of laws on historically
subordinated groups.143 The anti-subordination approach would permit
race-conscious laws designed to benefit historically disadvantaged
minorities significantly more than does the anti-classification
approach.
With respect to sex discrimination, the Court would likely interpret
the ERA in accordance with the anti-classification approach, i.e.,
subject all sex-motivated laws to strict scrutiny even if designed to
benefit women. First, the text of the ERA does not distinguish between
men and women suggesting that men would have the same right to
complain about laws or policies designed to benefit women as women
would have to complain about laws or policies designed to benefit men.
Second, under equal protection doctrine, the Court follows an anticlassification approach with respect to the level of scrutiny it applies to

140. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (applying strict
scrutiny on behalf of white plaintiff challenging college admissions policy that favored Black and
Latino applicants); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 505 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny on behalf of
white-owned construction company to government race-based set-aside program designed to
increase minority participation in government-funded construction contracts); see also Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009) (holding that fire department’s cancelling test results because
of disparate impact against Black candidates constituted discrimination against white candidates).
141. E.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 505 (applying strict scrutiny to local affirmative action plan
designed to remedy past discrimination); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 237 (1995) (remanding for lower court to apply strict scrutiny to federal race-conscious
program to increase minority participation in government construction contracting).
142. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10−11 (2003) (explaining the
anti-classification and the anti-subordination approaches).
143. Id. at 9 (“Antisubordination theorists contend that guarantees of equal citizenship
cannot be realized under conditions of pervasive social stratification and argue that law should
reform institutions and practices that enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed
groups.”).
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all classifications, whether suspect, such as race,144 quasi-suspect, such
as sex,145 or non-suspect, such as age.146
Currently, under equal protection doctrine, the Court has allowed
affirmative action and other proactive policies to benefit women that it
would not have upheld if it applied strict scrutiny to sex
classifications.147 As previously explained, the ERA would likely
subject all sex-conscious government decision-making to strict
scrutiny.148 Following the anti-classification approach, the Court would
likely apply strict scrutiny to laws designed to benefit women with the
effect that government would have to be “sex-blind,” i.e., ignore sex
and sex inequality. The effect would be that laws and government
policies designed to improve women’s opportunities would likely be
subject to strict scrutiny—because they necessarily take account of
sex—and likely struck down.
To elaborate, consider four kinds of state-sponsored affirmative
efforts to advance the interests and equality of girls and women: (1) sexbased affirmative action, (2) single-sex settings, including education,
(3) sex-neutral affirmative action, and (4) efforts to eliminate or modify
policies that have a disparate impact against women. Sex-based

144. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 508 (holding that race-based preferences to benefit
minority-owned construction firms are just as suspect and subject to strict scrutiny as preferences
for whites).
145. See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that all sex classifications
receive intermediate scrutiny, including the case at hand that involved a higher beer-purchasing
age for men than for women).
146. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (holding that age
classifications only receive rational basis scrutiny and upholding a mandatory retirement age for
police officers).
147. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (upholding law allowing women
to exclude more low-earning years for social security retirement benefits because “[r]eduction of
the disparity in economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of
discrimination against women [is] an important governmental objective.”); Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351, 353 (1974) (upholding state law allowing widows, not widowers, a property tax
exemption because, “[w]hether from overt discrimination or from the socialization process,” such
women faced more difficult barriers in the job market than widowers); United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 530 (1996) (citing with approval cases upholding sex-discriminatory laws for
compensatory or remedial purposes, and indicating that sex is treated differently from race). Such
sex-based preferential laws were thus based on societal disparities and speculative, though
plausible, assumptions about the socialization of women. Such justifications could not survive
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 485 (applying strict scrutiny to a race-based measure,
the Court stated that neither “broad-brush assumptions of historical discrimination” nor “societal
discrimination” suffice to establish a compelling interest. Instead, strict scrutiny requires the
government to demonstrate with particularity the discriminatory actions that a discriminatory
preference is expected to compensate for).
148. See discussion supra Sections III.A and III.B.1; see also Davis, supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
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affirmative action refers to policies that take account of sex to benefit
women. An example is when an employer or school of higher education
gives favorable weight to a female applicant’s sex. STEM, business and
medical schools, for example, seek to admit qualified women to reduce
their significant underrepresentation in those fields. Another example
is state and federal policies that give some priority to awarding some
government contracts to women-owned firms or to firms that subcontract with women-owned firms.149 Recall that under equal
protection doctrine, race-based affirmative action policies are usually
unlawful because the Court subjects them to strict scrutiny. But for sexbased affirmative action, existing equal protection law applies
intermediate scrutiny, which has allowed affirmative action policies for
women. That the Court, applying strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, tends to strike down similar policies when designed
to benefit racial minorities suggests that, applying strict scrutiny under
the ERA, it would likewise strike down such policies when designed to
benefit women.150
Justice Stevens lamented that, because of the different scrutiny
levels for race and sex, race-based affirmative action had become more
difficult to enact than sex-based affirmative action. Dissenting in
Adarand, though he did not criticize sex-based affirmative action, he
found it counterintuitive that state-sponsored efforts to remedy
discrimination against women would be more lawful (under
intermediate scrutiny) than race-based efforts to remedy
discrimination against Black people (under strict scrutiny):
[A]s the law currently stands, the Court will apply “intermediate
scrutiny” to cases of invidious gender discrimination and “strict
scrutiny” to cases of invidious race discrimination, while applying
the same standard for benign classifications as for invidious ones. If
this remains the law, then today’s lecture about “consistency” will
produce the anomalous result that the Government can more easily
enact affirmative-action programs to remedy discrimination against
women than it can enact affirmative-action programs to remedy
discrimination against African Americans — even though the
149. See Davis, supra note 74, at 448–49 (describing affirmative action policies).
150. See Brake, supra note 14, at 961 (“[R]ace-based affirmative action that is designed to
remedy discrimination against racial minorities must now meet a stricter legal test than sex-based
affirmative action that is designed to remedy discrimination against women.” (citing Adarand
Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995)) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); Heriot, supra note 89,
at 30 (“the ERA would very likely be interpreted to invalidate the many state-sponsored
“affirmative action” programs that currently give preferential treatment to women and womenowned businesses.”).
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primary purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to end
discrimination against the former slaves.151

Under the ERA, the anomaly criticized by Justice Stevens would
be eliminated because affirmative-action programs to remedy
discrimination against women would become as difficult to legally
justify as race-based affirmative action. The Court would likely subject
sex-based affirmative action to strict scrutiny, as it currently does for
race, and therefore more likely prohibit such policies.152 The Court
would also likely invalidate current federal policies designed to
increase women’s access to small business ownership and to
employment in companies with government contracts.153 Even
maternity-leave policies could be challenged under the ERA as
discrimination against men.154
The trend across the country among states to diversify corporate
boards illustrates how the ERA could invalidate equality-advancing
laws that might be upheld under current law. Several states have
enacted or are considering laws that would either mandate or pressure
corporations to enhance gender and racial diversity on corporate
boards and in senior management.155 California has led the way,
passing a law in 2018 that mandates gender quotas on corporate boards,
the minimum number of women determined by reference to the
number of directors on each board. In 2020, California added race and
LGBTQ quotas. Failure to comply risks steep fines.
Under equal protection doctrine, courts would very likely
invalidate the racial-quota mandate. Even if the state could convince
151. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. See discussion supra Section III.A; see also supra text accompanying note 116
(explaining why the Court is likely to apply strict scrutiny under the ERA); see also Brake, supra
note 14 and accompanying text.
153. See 13 C.F.R. § 127.101 (2019) (Small Business Administration provides affirmative
action program for contracting with female-owned businesses); see also 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.1 (2019)
(U.S. Department of Labor requires federal contractors and subcontractors to adopt affirmative
action programs that advance women. These include training programs and outreach programs).
154. See, e.g., Tennessee Maternity Leave Act (TMLA), TENN. CODE ANN. § 4–21–408
(West 2011) (mandating that employees who have been employed by the same employer for at
least 12 consecutive months can take 4 months of unpaid maternity leave for “adoption,
pregnancy, childbirth and nursing an infant”).
155. See Michael Hatcher & Weldon Latham, States are Leading the Charge to Corporate
Boards: Diversify!, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. (May 12, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/12/states-are-leading-the-charge-to-corporate-boardsdiversify/ (describing trend among states and in Congress to either encourage or mandate
inclusion of women on corporate boards). Apparently, Congress has also considered such
legislation, see id., although the likelihood of Congress passing such legislation seems quite
unlikely.
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the courts that racial representation on corporate boards were a
compelling state interest (which is doubtful under the current Court),156
the quota would be invalidated as a per se impermissible means.157 By
contrast, the gender quota might survive intermediate scrutiny because,
first, courts would more likely accept that gender diversity on corporate
boards is an important government interest, a lower bar than the
compelling interest requirement of strict scrutiny. Second, courts are
more likely to hold that a gender-based quota is a “substantially
related” means to achieving the interest even though quotas are not
considered narrowly-tailored means under strict scrutiny.158
Under the ERA, however, California’s gender quota would more
likely be invalidated than under current law. If the courts were to apply
absolute scrutiny under the ERA, the quota would, of course, be per se
unconstitutional. If the courts were to apply strict scrutiny, the quota
would still be invalidated for the same reasons as the race-based quota
would be under equal protection law.
Another kind of sex classification that would be vulnerable under
the ERA’s strict scrutiny are single-sex settings, such as schools,159
extracurricular activities such as sports,160 and other single-sex

156. See supra text accompanying note 104.
157. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and supra text accompanying 86.
Interestingly, separate lawsuits have been filed against both the gender quotas and the racial
quotas mandated by California law. The case challenging the racial-quota mandate has the easier
case, only needing to convince the court that the mandate fails “strict scrutiny review” that “can
only be justified by a compelling governmental interest, and its use of race and ethnicity must be
narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest.” Kevin LaCroix, California Board of Directors
Diversity Bill Signed Into Law, Challenged by Lawsuit, THE D&O DIARY (Oct. 11, 2020),
https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/10/articles/corporate-governance/california-board-ofdirectors-diversity-bill-signed-into-law-challenged-by-lawsuit/. The case challenging the genderquota mandate, by contrast, has to convince the court that the mandate does not even advance an
important government interest. See Cydney Posner, Federal District Court dismisses a challenge
to California board gender diversity statute, COOLEY PUBCO (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://cooleypubco.com/2020/04/21/court-dismisses-challenge-to-sb-826/.
158. See supra text accompanying note 86 (explaining that under Grutter, strict scrutiny does
not permit quotas)
159. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 596–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that
“[u]nder the constitutional principles announced and applied today, single-sex public education
is unconstitutional . . . [and] is functionally dead. . . . The enemies of single-sex education have
won”). Scalia goes on to describe how devastating the decision is for private institutions which
receive a substantial amount of funds from the government. See also Carrie Corcoran, Single-Sex
Education After VMI: Equal Protection and East Harlem’s Young Women’s Leadership School,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 987, 1010–11 (1997) (arguing that the higher the level of scrutiny that the Court
employs, the less likely it is that East Harlem’s Young Women’s Leadership School, an all-female
academy, “will pass constitutional muster”).
160. See id. (arguing that sports, such as football or wrestling, would be open to “any woman
ready, willing, and physically able to participate . . . as a constitutional matter”); see also Eugene
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settings161 including bathrooms, dormitories, locker rooms, prisons,162
and military quarters.163 I do not claim that such single-sex
arrangements would necessarily be unconstitutional. My claim is that
they would more likely be unconstitutional under the ERA than under
current doctrine simply because strict scrutiny is more difficult to
satisfy than intermediate scrutiny. Circumstances that involve strength
and other athletic differences, or which raise privacy or safety concerns,
might justify sex-exclusive sports, bathrooms, locker rooms, and prison
and military quarters. The Court’s opinion in Virginia lends some
support to this possibility. The Court invalidated the male-only
admissions policy of VMI but accepted that, “[a]dmitting women to
VMI would undoubtedly require alterations necessary to afford
members of each sex privacy from the other sex in living arrangements,
and to adjust aspects of the physical training programs.”164 Of course,
there the Court applied intermediate scrutiny, so the ERA might
preclude such accommodations, but the Court’s acceptance of such
adjustments based on sex at least suggests it believes that physical

Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1335,
1339, 1382–83 (1997) (interpreting the recently passed California Civil Rights Initiative, which
stated “[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual
or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting”, to conclude that “men’s sports teams must
become open to all . . . even if a women might be more likely to be injured when playing against
men”); but see Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D. Kan. 1996) (Exclusion of girls from
boys’ wrestling team violates the Equal Protection Clause, and privacy is not a sufficient
justification for the exclusion because “wrestling is an athletic activity and not a sexual activity.”
Note that the case involved total exclusion from the only available wrestling team, rather than the
creation of separate boys’ and girls’ teams.).
161. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 596 (Scalia J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (arguing
that the majority “indicates that if any program restricted to one sex is unique, it must be opened
to members of the opposite sex who have the will and capacity to participate in it”).
162. Joseph E. B. White, Educational Opportunities in Correctional Facilities, 4 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 407, 418 (2002) (claiming that state constitutions, most of which apply strict scrutiny
to gender classifications, may provide broader protection for female prisoners) (citing Molar v.
Gates, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 249 (Ct. App. 1979) (applying strict scrutiny to evaluate an equal
protection claim under the state constitution and finding the policy of placing pre-trial male
prisoners in minimum security facilities, but placing pre-trial female prisoners in maximum
security facilities, violated the state constitution. The court held that the alleged prohibitive
administrative cost of maintaining separate facilities was not a compelling governmental interest.
However, protecting female prisoners from sexual assault was a compelling governmental interest
but was not a sufficient reason to exclude females from minimum security facilities)).
163. John Galotto, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 521–22
(1993) (arguing that the majority of the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson opted not to apply strict
scrutiny to sex-based classifications out of fear that it could invalidate certain laws that
discriminate against women, such as exclusion from the draft, or be applied fatally to distinctions
between bathrooms and locker rooms).
164. Id. at 550 n.19.
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differences and privacy concerns are in some meaningful way “real”
differences that might justify separation by sex.165
The ERA would more likely invalidate other single-sex settings
that less directly implicate privacy concerns or physical differences.
Single-sex dormitories and halls within dormitories at public colleges
would be more vulnerable than single-sex bathing, dressing, and
sleeping quarters as the privacy need for their single-sex status is more
attenuated. Single-sex schools would be especially vulnerable as
students can generally study and attend classes without significantly
implicating privacy, safety, or physical differences. Even if women face
a greater risk of sexual assault on coeducational campuses than allfemale ones,166 the Court is unlikely to view excluding an entire sex as
a justified response to such a risk. Indeed, the Court in Virginia wrote
disapprovingly of justifications for excluding women from police forces
based on the risk of sexual misconduct.167 That the great majority of
colleges and universities are coeducational would undermine an allfemale school’s claim that excluding men was necessary to advance a
compelling interest.
In Virginia, the Court expressed a willingness to uphold single-sex
education if it were designed to diversify educational opportunities.168
The Court cautioned, however, that any such sex-based classifications

165. Indeed, the Court viewed physical differences as permanent. See id. at 533 (stating that
“[p]hysical differences between men and women, however, are enduring”).
166. My research did not discover any reliable studies comparing sexual assault rates on
coeducational and all-female campuses. That rates would be higher on co-educational campuses
is certainly plausible. See Is there Still a Need for Women’s Colleges?, COLLEGESTATS.ORG,
https://collegestats.org/2013/02/is-there-still-a-need-for-womens-colleges/ (last visited Jan. 10,
2021) (reasoning that since 90% of sexual assaults are committed by people (mostly men) known
to the victim, it follows that such gender-based violence is less likely to occur at women-only
institutions. According to the article, “72% of women’s college alumni reported feeling safe on
campus, compared with 64% at private and co-ed liberal arts institutions and only 37% at flagship
state schools.”). Of course, because the burden would be on the state to justify an all-female public
institution, a dearth of reliable findings on sexual assault rates would make the constitutionality
of such institutions that much more difficult to prove under strict scrutiny.
167. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 544 (1996) (reviewing with disapproval professions that
previously excluded women including police departments that claimed hiring women would “lead
to sexual misconduct”) (citing C. Milton et al., Women in Policing 32–33 (1974)); See also Molar
v. Gates, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 249 (Ct. App. 1979) (applying strict scrutiny to sex discrimination
claim under state constitution and holding that, while protecting female prisoners from sexual
assault during pre-trial detention was a compelling governmental interest, the state was not
justified in placing females prisoners in maximum security facilities instead of making minimum
security facilities safe for them).
168. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 535–37 (explaining that creating a diverse array of educational
options can justify the existence of a single-sex program if that is in fact the motive behind the
design).

FORDE-MAZRUI_03_17_21 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

3/17/2021 6:35 PM

WHY THE ERA WOULD ENDANGER WOMEN’S EQUALITY

41

had to be consistent with promoting equal opportunity for women:
Sex classifications may be used to compensate women “for
particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,” to “promot[e]
equal employment opportunity,” to advance full development of the
talent and capacities of our Nation’s people. But such classifications
may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal,
social, and economic inferiority of women.169

The Court’s language suggests that single-sex education could be
constitutional under equal protection doctrine provided it did not deny
opportunities to girls or women, or otherwise reinforce the inferiority
of or unfounded stereotypes about them. The Court thus did not rule
out single-sex education if the opportunities provided to both sexes
were equal in tangible and intangible ways.170 The Court held only that
VMI’s single-sex admissions policy was not constitutionally justified
given the uniqueness of VMI’s educational approach.171 The Court
reached this conclusion under intermediate scrutiny,172 distinguishing
sex from race.173
Under the ERA, by contrast, the Court would likely apply strict
scrutiny. It is most unlikely that state-run, single-race schools would
survive strict scrutiny. Likewise, single-sex schools under the ERA
would be vulnerable. Even if the Court found a way to distinguish
single-sex from single-race schools, the ERA would likely require a
greater justification for single-sex schools than is currently required
under the Equal Protection Clause.
Consider a third kind of affirmative effort to advance women’s
equality, namely, sex-neutral affirmative action.174 These are laws or
169. See id. at 533–34.
170. Id. at 535 n.8; Valorie K. Vojdik, Girls’ Schools After VMI: Do They Make the Grade?,
4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 69, 82 (1997).
171. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 (describing the ways in which VMI’s “unique” education
was not and could not be replicated at a separate, all-female institution); id. at 554 (“[W]e rule
here that Virginia has not shown substantial equality in the separate educational
opportunities the Commonwealth supports . . . .”).
172. See id. at 535–36 (“In cases of this genre, our precedent instructs that ‘benign’
justifications proffered in defense ofcategoricalexclusionswillnotbeaccepted automatically; a
tenable justification must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in
fact differently grounded.” (citing Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975); Califano
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212–13 (1977))).
173. See id. at 532–33 (“Without equating gender classifications, for all purposes, to
classifications based on race or national origin, the Court . . . has carefully inspected official action
that closes a door or denies opportunity to women (or to men). The heightened review standard
our precedent establishes does not make sex a proscribed classification. Supposed inherent
differences are no longer accepted as a ground for race or national origin classifications.”).
174. The term sex-neutral affirmative action draws from my previous work, which referred
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government policies designed to promote women’s equality that rely
on sex-neutral criteria. For example, family or parental (not maternal)
leave policies are sex-neutral because both mothers and fathers qualify.
But to the extent a legislature that designed such policies to support
working women, however, as is plausibly the case with the federal
Family and Medical Leave Act,175 such policies could be legally
vulnerable under the ERA. The reason follows the logic of the Court’s
treatment of race under the Equal Protection Clause, which would
invalidate most efforts to address race inequality, even through raceneutral means.176 Similarly, laws or policies designed to benefit women
would likely trigger strict scrutiny under the ERA and be struck down
even if such laws or policies employed sex-neutral means.
Two lines of Court doctrine support this argument. First, the Court
applies strict scrutiny to laws and government policies that discriminate
against racial minorities even if such laws use race-neutral means.177
According to that reasoning, the Constitution’s prohibition on
purposeful racial discrimination would be illusory if government could
discriminate against minorities so long as it uses policies race-neutral
on their face. For example, if a public university raised its admission
to laws or government policies designed to promote race equality that rely on race-neutral criteria
as race-neutral affirmative action. See Forde-Mazrui, Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, supra note
9, at 2351.
175. See Nev. Dep’t. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (noting that Congress
was motivated to pass the Family and Medical Leave Act by the historic “denial or curtailment
of women’s employment opportunities” that could be traced “[d]irectly to the pervasive
presumption that women are mothers first, and workers second”). See also Deborah J. Anthony,
The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Gender-Neutral Versus Gender-Equal,
16 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 459, 472–73 (2008) (“Despite the fact that the FMLA is
on its face gender-neutral, there were many gendered dynamics behind its passage. The law was
a continuation of feminist efforts toward equal employment for women, and was lauded by many
feminist groups. . . . Congress’s view of those who suffered most from the lack of leave policies—
and therefore those who stood to benefit most from the FMLA— were working women.”).
176. Because overt affirmative action is legal, despite it having to survive strict scrutiny, there
are not yet many examples of the use of race-neutral means to benefit minorities in service of
equality. The Court has, however, subjected race-neutral electoral districts to strict scrutiny
because the Court concluded that the districts were drawn with attention to race. See Shaw v.
Reno, 509 US 630, 631 (1993) (holding that electoral district, although drawn overtly based on
geography and not race, was subject to strict scrutiny because “bizarre” shape indicated a state
purpose to district voters based on race); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 901 (1995) (invalidating
electoral district because legislature was motivated by an overriding race-based purpose).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 717 (1992) (observing that the University
of Mississippi unconstitutionally raised its minimum ACT score in order to limit the admission of
Black applicants); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 339 (1960) (invalidating a re-drawn city
district because it was designed to exclude Blacks from the city); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 229 (1976) (assuming that a literacy test would be subject to strict scrutiny if intended to
exclude Black applicants for police officer jobs but holding that such an intention was not proven
and that therefore strict scrutiny does not apply).
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standards for all applicants for the purpose of excluding Black
applicants178 or a police department administered a particular
knowledge test to all applicants for the purpose of excluding Black
applicants,179 the Court would subject such actions to strict scrutiny and
would most likely invalidate them.
Second, since 1989, the Court has consistently held that
discrimination through race-based means for the purpose of benefiting
racial minorities is as presumptively unconstitutional as discrimination
against minorities.180 The Court explains, following its anti-classification
approach, that all racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny
regardless of which race is burdened or benefitted because equal
protection rights are individual rights guaranteed to all persons,
regardless of their race.181
The two principles from these lines of doctrine are that (1) statesponsored use of race-neutral means to discriminate against racial
minorities is as presumptively unconstitutional as discrimination
against minorities through race-based means, and (2) state-sponsored
discrimination to benefit racial minorities is as presumptively
unconstitutional as discrimination against minorities in favor of whites.
Combining these principles,182 state-sponsored use of race-neutral
means to benefit racial minorities is as presumptively unconstitutional
as the use of race-based means to discriminate against racial minorities.
178. See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 736 (noting that the University of Mississippi’s raising the
minimum ACT score to exclude Black applicants was unconstitutional).
179. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 245–48 (assuming that if District of Columbia Police Department
had intentionally used a literacy test to exclude Black applicants, it would have been subject to
strict scrutiny, but on the record, the Court held that proof of intent had not been made and
therefore the use of the test was not subject to strict scrutiny).
180. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (using strict scrutiny
to strike down government program that reserved a portion of public contracting opportunities
for minority-owned businesses); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204–05 (1995)
(remanding for lower court to apply strict scrutiny to federal race-conscious program to increase
minority participation in government construction contracting).
181. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493–94 (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that ‘[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.’ . . . As this Court has noted in the past, the ‘rights created by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights
established are personal rights.’ . . . ‘The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing
when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color.’”
(first quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; then quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22,
(1948); and then quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265, 289–90 (1978))).
182. See generally Forde-Mazrui, Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, supra note 9 (explaining
why equal protection doctrine logically prohibits race-neutral laws to promote racial equality);
Forde-Mazrui, The Canary Blind Constitution, supra note 9 (explaining the trend of colorblind
constitutionalism and its threat to addressing the sources of racial inequality).

FORDE-MAZRUI_03_17_21 (DO NOT DELETE)

44

3/17/2021 6:35 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 16

Put more simply, all races must be treated the same, and discrimination
through facially neutral means is still discrimination. Otherwise,
government could freely discriminate against whites in favor of
minorities so long as government used race-neutral means, which
would violate the Court’s insistence that whites have the same equal
protection rights as minorities. Although the Court has not explicitly
endorsed such a position, past cases have trended consistently in that
direction.183 The upshot is that any law or government policy designed
to benefit racial minorities through race-neutral means, such as the top
ten percent college admissions plan in Texas,184 are vulnerable to
constitutional challenge as policies designed to favor racial minorities
at the expense of whites.
That logic would likely apply to sex-neutral affirmative action
policies designed to benefit women. Such policies would logically be
subject to heightened scrutiny, notwithstanding that they are facially
sex-neutral, because they are designed to benefit women. In contrast to
race-neutral affirmative action to benefit minorities, however, sexneutral affirmative action to benefit women would currently be subject
to intermediate scrutiny and thus more likely upheld than race-neutral
affirmative action. Under the ERA, sex-neutral policies designed to
benefit women and to reduce sex inequality would likely be subject to
strict scrutiny and struck down as discrimination against men.
For example, if a state or Congress passed a law requiring
companies to provide paid parental or family leave, the law could be
challenged as unconstitutional depending on the legislature’s
motivation. The law would be sex-neutral in content as it would grant
parental or family leave to both male and female parents—not just to
mothers. If, however, a company could show that one of the legislative
motives was to support working women, it could challenge the law as
discriminating against men, even if the policy would benefit both
women and men. That the leave would be available to men would not
preclude the company, or a male employee who does not need the
183. For elaborations of this point, see Forde-Mazrui, supra note 182 and accompanying text.
184. The Texas system of higher education allocates a high percentage of admissions to
applicants who graduate in the top ten percent of their high school class. The policy does not take
account of race in its administration. It was designed, however, to increase the admission of people
of color. Under the Court’s colorblind constitutionalism, the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan could
be invalidated as discriminating for the benefit of Blacks and Latinxs. See Michelle Adams, Isn’t
It Ironic? The Central Paradox at the Heart of “Percentage Plans,” 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1732
(2001) (arguing that percentage plans, designed to be a race-neutral alternative “to achieve the
same ends as race-conscious affirmative action” are not “insulate[d] . . . from constitutional
challenge”). See generally Forde-Mazrui, Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, supra note 9.
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leave, from claiming discrimination against men. They could claim that
the legislature intended for the policy to benefit women and, as a result,
company resources are diverted to a policy intended to benefit women
rather than to policies designed to benefit employees regardless of sex.
Under current equal protection doctrine, a sex-neutral law motivated
by a purpose to benefit women would be subject to intermediate
scrutiny but likely would be upheld. Under the ERA, by contrast, the
Court would likely apply strict scrutiny because of its discriminatory
legislative purpose (i.e., to benefit women) and, accordingly, strike it
down. Thus, laws and government policies designed to reduce sex
inequality and to support women’s opportunities, even through sexneutral means, would risk invalidation under the ERA.
The fourth kind of affirmative effort to reduce sex inequality that
would be endangered by the ERA is the elimination or modification of
policies that unintentionally have a disparate impact against women. In
2009, in Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court held that an employer’s refusal to
use promotion-test results—because doing so would unintentionally
have a disparate impact on Black employees who took the test—was
discrimination against the white test-takers, and thus violated Title
VII.185 Ricci illustrates the Court’s colorblind approach to
antidiscrimination law. The exact scope of the Court’s holding is
unclear. Under a narrow reading, the employer’s refusal to use the test
results was discriminatory because the test had already been
administered and scored, so discarding the test results would harm
those individuals who already took the test under those existing rules.
By this reading, Ricci only prevents an employer from changing or
eliminating a test or other policy after identifiable individuals have
relied to their detriment on the existing test or policy. But this reading
would not prohibit an employer from changing or eliminating tests or
other policies to avoid racially disparate impacts in the future.
A broader reading of Ricci, by contrast, provides that any time an
employer changes a test or policy to avoid a racially disparate impact,
even if the change would take effect only in the future, the change
would discriminate against the racial groups that benefit from the

185. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579 (2009) (citations omitted) (“As the District
Court put it, the City rejected the test results because ‘too many whites and not enough minorities
would be promoted were the lists to be certified.’ . . . Without some other justification, this
express, race-based decision-making violates Title VII’s command that employers cannot take
adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.” (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F.
Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Conn. 2006))).
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existing test or policy. Put simply, to intentionally avoid a racially
disparate impact could itself constitute racial discrimination.186
The narrow reading of Ricci gains some support from the Court’s
observation that the city had announced the rules and procedures of
the test and that those who took the test had invested time and expense
in studying for it:
The injury arises in part from the high, and justified, expectations of
the candidates who had participated in the testing process on the
terms the City had established for the promotional process. Many of
the candidates had studied for months, at considerable personal and
financial expense, and thus the injury caused by the City’s reliance
on raw racial statistics at the end of the process was all the more
severe.187

In my assessment, however, the broader reading is a more accurate
indicator of how the Court will interpret and apply disparate-impact
liability in the future. Here is the key passage where the Court explains
why discarding the test results was discriminatory and therefore
required a strong justification:
Our analysis begins with this premise: The City’s actions would
violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some
valid defense. All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not
to certify the examination results because of the statistical disparity
based on race—i.e., how minority candidates had performed when
compared to white candidates. As the District Court put it, the City
rejected the test results because “too many whites and not enough
minorities would be promoted were the lists to be certified.”
Without some other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VII’s command that employers cannot take
adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.
. . . Whatever the City’s ultimate aim—however well-intentioned or
benevolent it might have seemed—the City made its employment
decision because of race. The City rejected the test results solely
because the higher scoring candidates were white. The question is

186. Professor Ian Haney-Lopez pointedly captures this reading of Ricci: “[C]onsidering
racial impact in order to avoid potential discrimination itself constitute[s] racial discrimination.
That bears repeating, though the logic induces vertigo: to consider race, even in order to avoid
discrimination, is discrimination.” Ian Haney-Lopez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1779, 1873 (2012).
187. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594.
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not whether that conduct was discriminatory but whether the City
had a lawful justification for its race-based action.188

For two reasons, I interpret the Court’s conclusion that the city
discriminated by race as premised on the city’s racial motivation
simpliciter rather than on the narrower fact that the test had already
been administered. First, the Court’s language in its “premise” passage
emphasizes the race-based motivation for the city’s decision, not the
individuals harmed by the decision. An employer’s decision to change
or eliminate a test because of its future racial impact would likewise be
a race-based decision based on the racial distribution of the likely effect
of the test. The Court’s reference to individuals injured by the city’s
action seems to reflect more a concern with the harm inflicted by the
city’s decision than the reason the city’s decision was discriminatory.
My second reason for finding the broad reading of Ricci indicative
of the Court’s trajectory is considering the counterfactual of reversing
the racial groups. Consider if Blacks and Latinos had done very well on
the promotion test. Imagine that the city discarded the promotion-test
results because, in the city’s view, too many Blacks and Latinos would
be promoted based on the test results. Assume that evidence revealed
city councilmembers stating, “A disproportionate number of Blacks
and Latinos scored well on the promotion test so let’s discard the test
results.” That would seem to be patently discriminatory. Now consider
if city councilmembers instead said, “We should certify these test
results because the test has already been administered, but let’s change
the test for the future to one that promotes fewer Blacks and Latinos.”
Would that not also seem discriminatory even though the change in the
test would only be in the future? If changing policies for the future to
avoid disparate impacts on racial minorities seems more acceptable
than changing policies to increase disparate impacts on minorities, it is
likely because harming historically disadvantaged groups seems more
troubling than seeking to help them. The problem for this intuition is
that the Court’s formalistic, anti-classification approach views racemotivated policies as equally suspect regardless of whether the policies
are designed to perpetuate white supremacy or to remedy racial
inequality.
The broad reading of Ricci is not a foregone conclusion, but it likely
reflects the Court’s increasingly colorblind approach to disparate
impact liability. That approach also has constitutional implications for
188.

Id. at 579–80.
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changing policies to avoid disparate impacts on the basis of race and
sex. Although the Court in Ricci was interpreting racial discrimination
under a statute (Title VII), the Court would presumably interpret what
constitutes intentional race discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause in a similar manner.189 That the Court, as previously explained,
interpreted sex discrimination under Title VII in Gilbert the same as it
did under the Equal Protection Clause in Geduldig illustrates the
Court’s tendency to interpret concepts of discrimination similarly
under constitutional and statutory law.190 Consequently, for race, any
government institution that changed a policy to avoid a racially
disparate impact could be challenged as having acted
unconstitutionally because, in doing so, it considered race. Moreover,
such a challenge would likely succeed because avoiding a racial
disparity from an employment practice is not a compelling interest
under strict scrutiny.191 Rather, per Croson, discrimination to remedy a
racial disparity requires proof that the disparity likely resulted from
discrimination that can be identified with “particularity.”192
Likewise, for sex, the Court would presumably interpret the Equal
Protection Clause to hold that a government employer’s changing a
policy because of its unintentional disparate impact against women
constitutes sex discrimination against men. The difference being that
under current law, the Court would likely allow the change under the
more lenient intermediate scrutiny test. The Court has upheld sexbased preferences on the basis of statistical disparities under
intermediate scrutiny, despite not accepting similar disparities under
strict scrutiny to justify race-based preferences.193

189. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the Court indicated that it need
not reach the equal protection claim because it could decide the issue under Title VII, but finding
it difficult to see why the analysis that led the Court to view the fire department’s discarding of a
disparately impacting promotion test as race discrimination would not apply in a constitutional
analysis).
190. See supra notes 131–134 and accompanying text.
191. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 485 (1989), the Court held
remedying a racial disparity in the award of government construction contracts through racebased means would only be compelling if the disparity were shown to have resulted from
identified discrimination. It follows that avoiding an unintentional racial impact would not be
considered compelling as the disparate impact would not be attributable to identified
discrimination.
192. Id. at 492 (explaining that “as a matter of state law, the city of Richmond has legislative
authority . . . [to] use its spending powers to remedy private discrimination, if it identifies that
discrimination with the particularity required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
193. See supra note 147 and accompanying text; see Croson, 488 U.S. at 485.
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Under the ERA, by contrast, the Court would likely apply strict
scrutiny to an employer’s policy change designed to avert an
unintentional disparate impact “on account of sex.” Under this more
stringent standard, such an action would be less likely to survive
constitutional review. Presumptively then, the ERA would prohibit the
government from changing an existing policy that disparately impacts
women in order to reduce that impact. For example, assume that a state
or the federal government, to reduce a disparate impact against women,
banned employers from considering an applicant’s salary at a previous
employer in setting the salary for the applied-for position.194 Under the
ERA, the Court could hold that banning the consideration of prior
salary to avoid depressing women’s pay constitutes sex discrimination
against men. A disgruntled company, or a male applicant who would
benefit from sharing his prior salary, could claim that the policy has the
purpose and effect of benefiting women at the expense of men. The
Court may well apply strict scrutiny and invalidate the policy. Sexblindness, which the ERA would likely require, means that disparities
between men and women must virtually always be ignored.
Indeed, that the ERA threatens the government’s ability to change
policies that disparately impact women suggests that it may likewise
prohibit any effort to eliminate disparate impact in the private sector
as well. The Court’s reasoning in Ricci, that changing a test with a
racially disparate impact against minorities constitutes intentional
discrimination against whites who benefited from the test, suggests that
Title VII’s disparate impact basis of liability is constitutionally
vulnerable. By this reasoning, a congressional or state requirement that
private employers change policies with a disparate impact is arguably a
requirement that private employers engage in intentional
discrimination. Government can no more require private actors to
discriminate than it can discriminate itself.
As Justice Scalia put it in his Ricci concurrence,195 when the “evil
day” comes that disparate impact liability has to be constitutionally
reconciled with equal protection doctrine, such liability for sex-based
disparate impacts would more likely survive scrutiny if evaluated under
intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny. For strict scrutiny, the
purported intentional discrimination of avoiding a disparate impact
must be justified by a compelling interest. Regarding race, the Court
194. See Levit, supra note 66; Watkins, supra note 66.
195. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Richard Primus, Equal
Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003)).
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has held that remedying what it calls “societal discrimination,” i.e.,
statistical racial disparities plausibly attributable to discrimination but
which are not identified with “particularity,” is not “compelling.”196 By
contrast, the Court has upheld remedying societal, sex-based
discrimination as “important” and lawful under intermediate scrutiny.
Disparate-impact liability essentially holds employers responsible
for the statistical disparities resulting from their employment practices
without requiring any proof, much less particularized proof, of
intentional discrimination. As explained previously,197 the Court has
upheld preferential legislation for women justified by generalized,
society-wide sex disparities, without requiring the legislation to be
tailored to particularized discrimination. Liability for employer policies
with a disparate impact against women would thus more likely survive
under the intermediate scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause than
under the strict scrutiny of the ERA.
C. The ERA’s Indirect Effects (If Pursued Through Legislation)
1. The Bad: No New Legislative Authority to Advance Women’s
Equality
There is no good here. The ERA would create no new legislative
authority to advance women’s equality that does not already exist.
Currently, federal and state governments can generally prohibit sex
discrimination in the public and private sectors.198 A significant
exception to such authority is that Congress cannot prohibit gendermotivated, private violence and other discrimination by private actors

196. Croson, 488 U.S. at 485, 492 (“[T]o show that a plan is justified by a compelling
governmental interest, a municipality that wishes to employ a racial preference cannot rest on
broad-brush assumptions of historical discrimination. . . . ‘Findings of societal discrimination will
not suffice. . . . As a matter of state law, the city of Richmond has legislative authority . . . [to] use
its spending powers to remedy private discrimination, if it identifies that discrimination with the
particularity required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
197. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
198. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e). See generally, e.g., Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (applying the Equal Pay Act to prohibit sex discrimination in private
companies); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (applying Title VII protections
in a private setting); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984) (upholding the authority of
states to prohibit sex discrimination in the private sector, rejecting First amendment challenge to
state law ban on sex discrimination by private club).
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that is not part of economic activity.199 The ERA is quite unlikely to
change this.
Some ERA supporters disagree, believing that Section 2 of the
ERA, which gives Congress authority to enforce the amendment,
would permit Congress to prohibit violence against women by private
actors.200 Professor Julie Suk’s recent book201 on the women pioneers
who championed the ERA lends support to this view. Suk argues that
many ERA advocates in the 1960s and ‘70s, including Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Congresswomen Martha Griffiths and Patsy Mink, saw
the ERA as a catalyst for legislatures to overhaul existing laws that
were inconsistent with the principle of equal rights. They envisioned
that federal and state legislation would follow the adoption of the ERA
with reforms to eliminate obstacles to women’s equality.202
I support expanding legislative authority to advance women’s
equality. I seriously doubt, however, that the text of the ERA would
achieve that goal. In United States v. Morrison, the Court held that
Congress could not prohibit private violence against women because
the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate only economic
activity.203 More importantly for predicting the ERA’s effect, the Court
reiterated in Morrison that Congress cannot regulate private, sexmotivated violence under the Fourteenth Amendment because that
amendment only restricts state-sponsored discrimination.204 In
199. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (“We accordingly reject the
argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that
conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The constitution requires a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local. . . . The regulation and punishment of
intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in
interstate commerce has always been the province of the States.” (citing United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995)).
200. See Neuwirth, supra note 75, at 156 (claiming that the ERA would provide a “solid
constitutional basis for legislation advancing women’s equality); MacKinnon, supra note 77, at
578 (“An ERA, as a constitutional amendment, would expand the congressional authority to
legislate” in the area of gender-based violence); Wharton, supra note 44, at 1229–39 (examining
the extent to which state ERAs extend to private actors, finding that many contain “broad
language” and “open-textured provisions” that “differ[] markedly from the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment and more readily support[] extension to private actors.”). See also supra
notes 67–71 and accompanying text (discussing ERA supporter expectations that it would expand
congressional authority to prohibit gender-motivated violence and genital mutilation).
201. See generally SUK, WE THE WOMEN, supra note 50.
202. See id. at 132–35.
203. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (holding that “thus far in our Nation’s history our cases
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is
economic in nature”).
204. See id. at 627 (stating VAWA is not authorized by the Commerce Clause); see id. at 628
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“The Court says both that it leaves Commerce Clause precedent
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explaining why the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit Congress
to regulate private, sex-motivated violence, the Court relied on the Civil
Rights Cases of 1883, which held that Congress could not prohibit racial
discrimination by private companies under the Fourteenth
Amendment.205 The ERA likewise only applies to state-sponsored
discrimination: “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any State on account of sex.”206
Therefore, its enforcement provision would only permit Congress to
punish or otherwise regulate state-sponsored, sex-motivated violence
and other private discrimination. Nor would the ERA expand the
Commerce Power to reach private violence and discrimination against
women.
2. The Ugly: The ERA Could Harm Women’s Equality Through
Existing Civil Rights Laws
As discussed above, the ERA’s self-executing operation could
harm women’s equality in the private sector by invalidating laws that
create liability for private-employer policies that disparately impact
women.207 In addition, the ERA could indirectly harm women’s
equality in the private sector by influencing how courts interpret civil
rights statutes that regulate both state and private actors. As the Court
has become increasingly strict against affirmative action under
constitutional law, the Court has also taken a harder stance against
affirmative action under Title VII and other civil rights laws.208 In the
shadow of equal protection doctrine, the Court is already likely to
impose interpretations of civil rights laws that make it difficult for
private companies to engage in affirmative action for women. Indeed,
the case that narrowed the permissibility of affirmative action under
Title VII was a sex discrimination case.209 The reason that the Court’s
statutory interpretations tend to follow its constitutional
interpretations is to avoid confronting a constitutional issue, which may
undisturbed and that the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42
U.S.C. § 13981, exceeds Congress’s power under that Clause.”).
205. See id. at 599 (syllabus) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment places limitations on the
manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. Foremost among them is the
principle that the Amendment prohibits only state action, not private conduct.” (citing Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883)).
206. See supra text accompanying note 49 (emphasis added).
207. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
208. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 631–37 (1987)
(upholding affirmative action for a woman under seemingly stricter standard than the test applied
previously in Utd. Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)).
209. Id. (upholding preferential hiring of women over men under fairly restrictive test).
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arise if legislation permits actions that the Constitution forbids.
Because Title VII applies identically to state and private employers, the
Court is inclined to interpret the statute as holding state and private
employers to the same standards. The Court thus tends to hold that
Title VII permits state and private employers to do only what the
Constitution permits state employers to do. Because the ERA would
make it more constitutionally suspect for state employers to engage in
sex-based affirmative action, the Court would likely interpret Title VII
more restrictively with respect to affirmative action for women by
public -- and private -- employers. A similar effect is likely with other
civil rights laws that prohibit sex discrimination, such as Title IX, which
applies equally to state and private schools, colleges, and universities
that receive federal funds. Interpreting Title IX to invalidate sexconscious policies could jeopardize a host of policies at state and
private colleges designed to benefit women.210
D. Stability and Recognition of Women’s Equality
Two other goals of ERA supporters are stability and recognition of
women’s equality. The first aims to stabilize constitutional protection
of women’s equality by explicitly guaranteeing such equality in the

210. The two areas in which Title IX protections designed to benefit women could be most
detrimentally impacted by the ERA are university admissions policies and sex-segregated athletic
teams. The legislative history of the ERA illustrates how the adoption of the amendment could
invalidate the exemption in Title IX that allows single-sex public universities to discriminate on
the basis of sex in their admissions policies. Report of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Equal
Rights for Men and Women, S. Rep. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1972) (“With respect to
education, the Equal Rights Amendment will require that State supported schools at all levels
eliminate . . . official practices which exclude women or limit their numbers. . . . [A]dmission
would turn on the basis of ability or other relevant characteristics, and not on the basis of sex. . .
. State schools and colleges currently limited to one sex would have to allow both sexes to
attend”); Patricia Werner Lamar, The Expansion of Constitutional and Statutory Remedies for Sex
Segregation in Education: The Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, 32 EMORY L. J. 1111, 1159 (1983) (arguing that the adoption of the ERA will necessitate
the application of strict scrutiny to sex in the same way that it is applied to race and as a result,
“single-sex public schools would be prohibited.” The impact of strict scrutiny and the ERA would
not be limited to public universities, but private as well because “[t]he Title IX exemptions that
would allow federal funding of private single-sex institutions . . . would constitute unacceptable
support of private discrimination which would violate the fourteenth amendment if practiced by
the state.”); Rebecca A. Kiselewich, In Defense of the 2006 Title IX Regulations for Single-Sex
Public Education: How Separate Can Be Equal, 49 B.C. L. REV. 217, 254–60 (2008) (explaining
that though the text of Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in athletics, courts have recognized
various government objectives to justify the existence of single-sex sports teams, most notably to
“maintain, foster, and promote athletic opportunities for girls.” However, the Supreme Court has
yet to weigh in on the constitutionality of sex-segregated athletic teams and there exists a spirited
debate among scholars as to whether the continued existence of such “separate but equal” teams
harms rather than helps women).
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Constitution, rather than relying on judicial interpretations of the
Equal Protection Clause—interpretations that might change.211 The
second goal is to enshrine in our Constitution an express recognition
that women are equal to men.212
These goals are unquestionably important. As to stability, I agree
that the Court would be less likely to decide that women’s equality is
unprotected by the Constitution if there were an express provision
guaranteeing such equality. My concern, however, is that the Court’s
likely interpretation of the ERA—that all sex distinctions are
presumptively unlawful even when they benefit women—would be
worse for women’s equality than the unlikely risk that the Court would
reverse fifty years of equal protection precedent. Moreover, Congress
is very unlikely to repeal civil rights laws prohibiting sex discrimination,
especially government discrimination, which is the only discrimination
that the ERA would prohibit. Also, stability could be achieved through
an alternative ERA that avoids the harms of the current ERA. The next
Part discusses that option.
Regarding recognition, three reasons suggest that this goal does not
justify the ERA. First, a formal expression of equality is not worth the
cost of undermining substantive equality.213 Second, it could harm
211. See Davis supra note 74; Wharton, supra note 44, at 1213 (“Lower courts, commentators,
and even Supreme Court Justices, have criticized the intermediate standard as vague, poorly
defined and malleable, providing insufficient guidance in individual cases and giving broad
discretion to individual judges in deciding the importance of an interest and whether the
classification is substantially related.”).
212. See MacKinnon, supra note 77, at 579 (“[A]n ERA would provide an inspiration and
impetus for public policy and a powerful symbolic support for women’s equality at all social levels
at the apex of the legal system in a culture in which law has power and meaning, and sometimes
leads.”); Brown et al., supra note 64; Neuwirth, supra note 75 (“[A]mending the Constitution to
include sex equality as a fundamental human right will send a clear public message that women
are no longer to be treated as second-class citizens. The intentional omission of women has
perpetuated a lack of respect for women and engendered a culture that allows sexual harassment
to continue unchecked.”). Although Justice Ginsburg supported adding the ERA to the
Constitution, it should be acknowledged that she believed that the process would need to begin
anew because the congressional deadline on the ERA had expired. See de Vogue, supra note 77.
Professor Julie Suk’s recent book on the ERA offers a moving understanding of how the ERA
would recognize women. Suk posits that the ERA would enable women to be recognized as
Founding Mothers because women drafted the ERA, voted for it in Congress, and championed
it in state legislatures as activists and legislators. See SUK, WE THE WOMEN, supra note 50, at 3
(“If and when the ERA is added to the Constitution, our Constitution will officially have founding
mothers as well as founding fathers. The ERA will be the only piece of our nation’s fundamental
law that was written by women after suffrage, adopted by women leading the way in Congress,
given meaning by women lawyers and judges, and ratified by women lawmakers in state
legislatures of the twenty-first century . . . .”).
213. This point applies equally to Suk’s desire to recognize women as Founding Mothers. See
supra note 212. Initially, I observe that it is unclear why serving in the Congress and state
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equality for other groups who are not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution by lending credence to the claim that the Constitution
protects only those groups explicitly mentioned therein. The
Constitution does not name any group in the Equal Protection
Clause;214 rather, it applies to “persons.” That has allowed the Court to
expand protections to subjugated groups as their discrimination has
become recognized by society and the courts, including different racial
and national-origin groups,215 women,216 gays and lesbians,217
“hippies,”218 undocumented immigrant children,219 noncitizens,220

legislatures that ratify a constitutional amendment is necessary to consider women as founding
mothers. Women have brought about as activists the passage of many constitutional amendments,
including the nineteenth amendment, protecting the right to vote against sex discrimination,
without serving in Congress or most state legislatures, and yet they certainly deserve recognition
as mothers of such amendments. Indeed, Suk’s book inspiringly recounts the role of women in
the suffrage movement producing the nineteenth amendment, from Seneca Falls in 1848, to
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony’s initial drafting of the nineteenth amendment, to
the suffragists who testified before Congress for decades in favor of the amendment, to
Representative Jeannette Rankin who advanced the amendment in Congress although lost her
congressional seat by the time the amendment was approved by Congress. See SUK, WE THE
WOMEN, supra note 50, at 4. Second, if my concerns over the ERA come to pass, it would be
ironic, arguably tragic, for women to author an amendment that harms women’s equality.
214. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (referring to “persons” with no explicit mention of race);
But see U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that race
discrimination, unlike sex discrimination, is protected by the “text” of the Equal Protection
Clause).
215. See generally, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (Blacks); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Chinese nationals); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)
(Mexicans); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Whites); Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (Latinos/Hispanics).
216. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (“By providing dissimilar treatment for
men and women who are thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal
Protection Clause.”).
217. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“We must conclude that
Amendment 2 classifies [gays and lesbians] not to further a proper legislative end but to make
them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of
persons a stranger to its laws. Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”).
218. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537–38 (1973) (holding that a law
terminating food stamp benefits for unrelated people living in the same household violated the
Equal Protection Clause. A look at the legislative history revealed that the new regulations were
“specifically aimed at the ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’”).
219. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223–24 (1982) (holding that children have the right to
equal access to education under the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of their immigration
status).
220. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (“We hold that a state statute that
denies welfare benefits to resident [noncitizens] and one that denies them to [noncitizens] who
have not resided in the United States for a specified number of years violate the Equal Protection
Clause.”).
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nonmarital children,221 and people with mental disabilities.222 The ERA
would, for the first time, expressly identify a particular group for
equality protection, implying that the absence of explicit protections
for other groups means that they are not constitutionally entitled to full
equality. The very goal of recognition is predicated on the claim that
full women’s equality requires such recognition. If women are fully
equal to men only if the Constitution expressly says so, then the
message to the other groups mentioned above,223 as well as yet-to-beprotected groups, such as gay, transgender,224 mentally or physically
disabled,225 undocumented immigrants, and impoverished people is
that they are not fully equal until they can amend the Constitution in
their favor, a political and practical impossibility.
Third, recognition could be achieved through an alternative ERA
that overcomes the shortcomings and harmfulness of the original ERA.

221. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (“[Nonmarital] children are not
‘nonpersons.’ They are humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly ‘persons’ within the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
222. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(invalidating a city’s rejection of a petition to establish a home for people with mental disabilities).
223. I noted above that several groups have been protected by the Court under the Equal
Protection Clause, yet I am saying here that their status may be less secure under the ERA. See
supra notes 215-222. My point is that, although they have been protected in unusually problematic
cases, the Court does not as yet accord all the groups heightened protection under the Equal
Protection Clause. Of course, given this article’s case against strict scrutiny, that may be a blessing.
I believe, however, that intermediate scrutiny for such groups would better serve their equality
interests than the rational basis with teeth that seems to apply on an ad hoc basis currently. The
ERA might dissuade the Court from applying intermediate scrutiny to protect such groups on the
ground that each group needs a constitutional amendment to protect them.
224. I noted above that the Court has protected gays and lesbians under the Equal Protection
Clause. See Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). I doubt that the ERA would encourage the
Court to retreat from the precedents, but it could suggest that the Court should not apply a more
heightened scrutiny to sexual-orientation discrimination than the rational basis with teeth it has
done so far. I also recognize and support that the Bostock case might lead the Court to recognize
gender identity and sexual orientation as sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause
and, similarly, might lead the Court to interpret the ERA to protect gender identity and sexual
orientation under the ERA. As previously noted, see supra note 7 and accompanying text, this
article does not directly address the implications of the ERA for LGBTQ+ rights, which likely
raises distinctive issues compared to the equality of women compared to men. I certainly
encourage scholars and others to give attention to the potential costs and benefits of the ERA for
LGBTQ+ rights compared to the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Kate Kelly, The Equal Rights
Amendment is a Queer Movement, 309 QSALTLAKE MAG. (Mar. 2020), https://amp.issuu.com/
qsaltlake/docs/qsl2003e/s/10229917.
225. Though it is true that the Court protected mental disability rights in Cleburne, see
generally 473 U.S. at 432, and I doubt the Court would pull back from that precedent, it did so
under rational basis scrutiny. It is still open to the Court to protect persons with disabilities under
heightened scrutiny, preferably intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny. But the ERA could
discourage higher protection for people with disabilities than the Court has already accorded
them.
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Women’s inequality remains a serious problem in America, and if a
constitutional amendment can prohibit practices that perpetuate such
inequality and encourage policies that would promote women’s
equality, such an amendment should be drafted, proposed and ratified.
The next Part identifies some models on which to base such an
alternative ERA.
IV. ALTERNATIVE ERAS
Equality advocates have proposed alternative amendments that
would better promote women’s equality than the ERA. Representative
Carolyn Maloney (D-NY), for example, has proposed an amendment
moderately more promising than the ERA. Her proposal reads:
Section 1. Women shall have equal rights in the United States and
every place subject to its jurisdiction. Equality of rights under the
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of sex.
Section 2. Congress and the several States shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date
of ratification.226

The main difference between Maloney’s proposal and the ERA is
that hers inserts into the ERA a beginning sentence declaring that
“Women shall have equal rights” in the United States. The ERA only
refers to “sex,” not “women.” Maloney’s proposal has three potential
benefits over the original ERA. First, by emphasizing women, courts
might interpret it to allow some sex discrimination designed to benefit
women that would not be allowed if designed to benefit men. Second,
that the first sentence states that women will have equal rights, without
stating that such rights are against discrimination by the government,
might support an interpretation that the rights would include a right
against private discrimination. Third, by mentioning women explicitly,
it sends a stronger recognition message that women are equal to men.227

226. H.R.J. Res. 35, 116th Cong. (2019).
227. A fourth difference between Maloney’s proposed ERA and the original ERA is that
Maloney’s would authorize states, as well as Congress, to enforce the amendment, whereas the
original ERA would only authorize Congress to enforce the amendment. That seems unlikely to
grant states any additional power, however. First, unlike the federal government, states are
presumed as a matter of constitutional law to be authorized to pursue whatever goals their state
constitutions permit unless the federal Constitution limits such power. Thus, states are already
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Such potential benefits, though plausible, are not likely to result.
First, the Court would be unlikely to authorize discriminatory laws or
policies designed to benefit women because the rest of the amendment
still guarantees equality of rights simply “on account of sex,” i.e., to
everyone, not just women, and thus men should still be entitled to
complain that a law for the benefit of women discriminates against
men. Second, without more, stating that “equal rights” are guaranteed
to women would likely be interpreted in the conventional way in which
rights are understood in American constitutional law, as negative rights
against the government. The second sentence reinforces that view as it
declares that equality of rights shall not be denied by states or the
federal government. The third benefit, that a stronger message of
women’s equality would be expressed, is true. That message is
outweighed, however, by the inadequacy of the proposed amendment
to correct the shortcomings of the ERA. Nonetheless, the Maloney
amendment appears to be moderately less harmful to women’s equality
than the original ERA.
Other Western countries’ constitutions and international
conventions are also worth considering, especially because ERA
supporters have noted that Canada and many European countries are
ahead of the United States in protecting women’s equality because
women’s equality is explicitly guaranteed in these nations’
constitutions.228 For example, the constitutions of some European
empowered to advance women’s equality without an express authorization in the Constitution.
Second, the express authorization for states to enforce the ERA would not give states the
authority to discriminate on account of sex in violation of Section 1 of the Maloney amendment,
even for the benefit of women. The Court in Adarand held that Congress could not engage in
race-based affirmative action for remedial purposes any more than states could, notwithstanding
that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress, but not the states, to enforce
the amendment, including the Equal Protection Clause. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995) (stating that “congruence” between the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the federal government comply with equal protection restraints on
race-based decision-making).
228. See Davis, supra note 74 , at 455 (“The ERA’s absence from U.S. law is particularly
glaring in light of the constitutional provisions adopted by sister nations, such as Canada and the
nations of Europe, that specifically address sex-based discrimination.”) (citing to the European
Convention on Human Rights art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950 (explicitly mentioning “sex” as one of the
many grounds on which a person cannot be discriminated against or denied the equal “enjoyment
of rights and freedoms” set forth in the Convention) and to the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part I, art. 15, 1982 (stating that individuals cannot be discriminated against on the
basis of “sex”)); Gila Stopler, The Free Exercise of Discrimination: Religious Liberty, Civic
Community and Women’s Equality, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 459, 481 (2004) (“Feminists
note the protection afforded to women in American jurisprudence is far from being consistent
with the standards of protection for women in other western countries, or the protections afforded
to women in international law through [the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
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countries expressly allow or require sex-conscious policies that advance
women’s equality. Professor Julie Suk has analyzed the sex-equality
provisions of several countries with sex-equality ratings higher than the
United States and found that their constitutions make explicit
authorizations for policies designed to increase women’s
representation in professional careers, corporate boards, and political
institutions.229 Many also have explicit provisions to support mothers
and to break down traditional sex roles.230
Suk observes, for example, that France and Germany contain “three
features that function to reduce gender inequalities: nondiscrimination,
authorization of special measures to promote sex equality, and
protection of mothers.” The French Constitution provides: “[France]
shall ensure equality before the law, without distinction of origin, race,
or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. . . . Statutes shall promote equal
access by women and men to elective offices and posts as well as to
professional and social positions.”231
In international law, the most comprehensive, multi-national treaty
on women’s equality is the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
The Convention prohibits discrimination against women. It also
authorizes “special measures” to advance women’s equality until such
measures are no longer needed. CEDAW also expressly authorizes
legislation to protect maternity. In relevant part, the Convention
provides
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political,
social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures,
including legislation, to ensure the full development and
advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms
on a basis of equality with men.
Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at
accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be
considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but
shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal
or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when
Discrimination Against Women] . . . .”).
229. See Julie C. Suk, An Equal Rights Amendment for the Twenty-First Century: Bringing
Global Constitutionalism Home, 28 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 381, 385 (2017) (describing the
various constitutional provisions in other countries that substantively concern women’s status).
230. See id. at 381–82, 405–408.
231. See id. at 421.
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the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been
achieved.
Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those
measures contained in the present Convention, aimed at protecting
maternity shall not be considered discriminatory.232

Advancing an approach analogous in some ways to European and
international approaches, feminist scholars Catherine MacKinnon and
Kimberlé Crenshaw have proposed an amendment with explicit
language that would not only authorize legislative and executive
measures to remedy sex inequality, but it would also mandate such
measures:
Section 1. Women in all their diversity shall have equal rights in the
United States and every place subject to its jurisdiction.
Section 2. Equality of rights shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex (including
pregnancy, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity), and/or
race (including ethnicity, national origin, or color), and/or like
grounds of subordination (such as disability or faith). No law or its
interpretation shall give force to common law disadvantages that
exist on the ground(s) enumerated in this Amendment.
Section 3. To fully realize the rights guaranteed under this
Amendment, Congress and the several States shall take legislative
and other measures to prevent or redress any disadvantage suffered
by individuals or groups because of past and/or present inequality
as prohibited by this Amendment, and shall take all steps requisite
and effective to abolish prior laws, policies, or constitutional
provisions that impede equal political representation.
Section 4. Nothing in Section 2 shall invalidate a law, program, or
activity that is protected or required under Section 1 or 3.233

In addition to requiring remedial measures, the MacKinnonCrenshaw proposal makes clear that the amendment would protect
sexual orientation and gender identity and would extend protection
beyond sex to include race and other yet-to-be-recognized stigmatized
groups who share “like grounds of subordination.” It would also
require Congress and the states to redress “any disadvantage suffered

232. United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, Articles 3 and 4, https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm
(last visited Mar. 7, 2021). I thank Professor Jay Butler for bringing CEDAW to my attention.
233. Catharine A. MacKinnon & Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Reconstituting the Future: An
Equality Amendment, 129 YALE L. J. FORUM 343, 359–62 (2019).
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by individuals or groups because of past and/or present
discrimination.” This would largely avoid the restrictive scope of the
original ERA both as to women and as to other groups that the original
ERA leaves out.
A potential drawback with the MacKinnon-Crenshaw proposal for
some sex equality advocates is its mandatory rather than permissive
approach. One might believe that the complexities of remedying
inequalities by sex and other traits supports leaving it to the political
process to determine what remedial measures are, on balance, most
effective. A constitutional mandate to engage in remedial measures
suggests that courts would have authority to enjoin the political
branches to engage in judicially-fashioned remedial policies. Where the
original ERA would likely prohibit sex-conscious remedial measures,
the alternative of mandating sex-conscious remedial obligations
arguably goes too far in the other direction.
I propose, as a basis for deliberation, the following amendment that
takes an approach between the ERA and the Mackinnon-Crenshaw
proposal:
Section 1. Women shall have equal rights in the United States and
every place subject to its jurisdiction. Equality of rights shall not be
denied by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. Nothing in Section 1 shall be construed to prevent
Congress or the States from acting on account of sex to advance sex
equality. Nor shall this amendment be construed to prevent groups
from seeking equal rights under other provisions of the
Constitution.
Section 3. Congress and the several States shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Congress’s power to redress inequality in the public and private
sectors shall extend at least as far as that of the States.

I observe some key features of this proposal. First, Section 1
incorporates the benefits of the Maloney amendment of expressly
recognizing “Women” as having equal rights. Second, Section 3 grants
state enforcement power. Although that is probably not necessary, it
may help to clarify for state officials and courts that the amendment
does not reduce states’ authority to engage in sex-conscious equalityadvancing measures. Third, the last sentence of Section 3 ensures that
Congress can regulate sex discrimination and sex-motivated violence in
the private sector as much as states can. This would effectively overturn
the holding of Morrison that Congress cannot regulate private violence
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and other private discrimination that is not part of economic activity.
Accordingly, although individuals and groups might retain privacy
rights to discriminate by sex in, for example, admission to a home or
exclusive private club, Congress can regulate, as far as states can,
violence against women and discrimination in circumstances not
protected by individual rights. Fourth, Section 2 immunizes sexconscious, equality-advancing measures from challenge under Section
1. Fifth, Section 2 authorizes such measures but does not require them,
according government discretion to determine what remedial measures
would be most effective. Finally, the last sentence of Section 2 makes
clear that guaranteeing sex equality does not imply that other groups
must secure a constitutional amendment to achieve equal rights under
the Constitution.
The foregoing examples suggest that an alternative ERA could be
drafted that ensures that courts could not block legitimate efforts to
advance women’s equality. In support of the original ERA, however,
one might concede that an alternative ERA would be preferable but
still seek final ratification of the original ERA for the time being. If an
alternative ERA could be ratified, the reasoning goes, it could be
ratified as soon as politically feasible. In the meantime, should we not
secure ratification of the original ERA?
No. For two reasons, ratifying the original ERA and then pursuing
a better alternative would endanger women’s equality. First, the
original ERA would not improve the status quo—rather, it would make
things worse for women’s equality by proscribing sex-conscious
strategies to reduce sex inequality. Second, ratifying the ERA would
make ratifying an alternative amendment more difficult. Much of the
public would believe that the goals of the ERA had been achieved and
that efforts to ratify another amendment would be unnecessary. And
some people who would have supported an alternative ERA might be
reluctant to complicate the Constitution with repeated amendments on
the same subject matter. In short, amending the Constitution to
advance women’s equality is likely a “one and done,” and we need to
get our one shot right.
CONCLUSION
The ERA would likely require courts to treat sex more like race,
subjecting all state-sponsored sex discriminations to strict (or even
absolute) scrutiny, rather than to the intermediate scrutiny applied to
sex classifications under current equal protection doctrine.
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Unfortunately for racial equality, the Court has applied strict scrutiny
to prohibit race-conscious efforts to remedy past discrimination, and
the current Court is likely to prohibit affirmative efforts to achieve
racial diversity as well. Courts are also moving toward invalidating both
laws that aim to reduce racial inequality through race-neutral means
and laws that create liability for policies that disparately impact racial
minorities. The ERA would ask the Court to do the same with sex. The
effect would be that government policies designed to advance women’s
equality or to avoid having a disparate impact against women would be
presumptively unconstitutional, even if pursued through sex-neutral
means.
The failure of the ERA to address the sex inequalities of today is
not the fault of those who proposed the ERA or of those who have
fought for its ratification over the ensuing decades. When proposed in
1923, few, if any, Americans imagined that constitutional provisions that
guarantee race and sex equality would be interpreted by courts to
invalidate efforts to achieve race and sex equality. Intentional
discrimination against Blacks and women, by government and private
actors, was pervasive. Race and sex equality advocates sought to enlist
the courts in prohibiting discrimination against Black people and
women. But no one thought that constitutionalizing race or sex equality
would prohibit the very political institutions that were oppressing
Blacks and women from trying to rectify that oppression. Nonetheless,
that is the state of the current Supreme Court jurisprudence on race,
one that requires color-blindness even at the expense of racial equality
and one that will likely be reinforced by the recent rightward shift of
the Court. Similarly, the ERA would likely mandate sex blindness at
the expense of women’s equality.
Though it can be very disappointing to have come this far in
constitutionalizing the ERA, we should not let hope for what could
have been blind us from what could happen with the current ERA. The
courageous advocates of the ERA can take pride in the legislative and
judicial protections of sex equality that have no doubt been brought
about because of their activism. What is needed now is a fresh start, a
new ERA designed to fit the inequalities that persist today and one
that prevents the courts from blocking such reforms. In the immediate
term, we need to put the original ERA to rest.

